an essay on st. anselm's proof for the existence of god

That God Exists in an Ideal World
by Anthony Peter Iannini | last edited: 06.11.2011 | originally written: 2000		  


Essay Overview:
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This essay attempts to show why existence can not be an additional property of a supposed (or possibly real) enitity or being or object, such as god. As arguments for the existence of god go, however, this is perhaps one of the most powerful if not the most powerful argument because it is true if a particular understanding of it is allowed. For clarity and emphasis, Anselm's quotations are colored in light green and quotations by others are colored in light blue. Section headings are written in bold salmon.

A certain understanding of existence is necessary for the argument to work and I do not think this reading of the term "existence" holds true because it is being added as a property of something that already exists, perhaps, at least, in the mind. Also, there can be serious doubts about whether a finite being like a human can comprehend infinity, or the greatest being, or god, in the first place.

Though our human minds may be infinite in their potential to represent or think about things, this does not mean we can actually, at once, represent, in thought, the greatest being which very well may be an infinite being if it exists.

However, there is something interesting about the argument and, given certain conditions in reality, it may be the case that the greatest possible being exists. However, I stop short of saying that the argument necessarily works. Even if the greatest being exists in the world, whether the world is entirely mental, physical, both or neither, I do not see any room for a proof that such a being exists in any objective or public form.



0. Introduction: This essay focuses on the argument for the existence of god put forth by St. Anselm (1033-1109) in the Proslogion that is objected to by Gaunilo, the monk of Marmoutier in his Reply on Behalf of the Fool. Anselm’s argument, which came to be known as the ontological argument (due to Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804) has been the focus of metaphysical analysis since its inception in the eleventh century.

In the following essay, I present (1) an outline and summarization of Anselm’s argument, (2) Gaunilo’s argument against Anselm, (3) Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, (4) an analysis of the debate and an analysis of existence within a wider philosophical context, and (5) a plausible view of reality and existence, as wholly ideal, that allows Anselm's argument to succeed.

1. Anselm’s Argument in the Proslogion: In chapter two of the Proslogion, Anselm sets out to prove that god, by definition, must exist. He writes, “Indeed we believe You [god] to be something than which nothing greater can be thought.” (p.93 see following reference for all following page numbers in parentheses) 1. For convenience, I will refer to “something than which nothing greater can be thought” as "Ng" from this point forward.

Next, Anselm introduces the atheist "Fool", who “...has said in his heart that God does not exist...”(p.93). However, Anselm asserts that even the Fool must, when presented with the concept of Ng, understand Ng. Even though the Fool may not think that Ng exists, the concept of Ng is, Anselm argues, in the Fool's understanding.

To support the notion that a thing can be in the understanding and not in reality, Anselm uses the example of a painter and the painter’s relation to his uncreated painting. “For when an artist envisions what he is about to paint, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand [judge] that there exists what he has not yet painted.” (p.94). In other words, though the painter may have the painting in his understanding, the painting is also understood to not currently exist in reality. Once the painting is produced however, the painting then exists both in the understanding and in reality.

At this point, Anselm summarizes the position of the argument thus far. The Fool is, according to Anselm, “...convinced that Ng exists at least in his understanding; for when he hears of this being, he understands [what he hears], and whatever is understood is in the understanding.” (p.94). Here, Anselm presents the argument that to exist in reality is greater than to exist in the understanding alone.

Therefore, if Ng only existed in the understanding, then “... that than which a greater cannot be though would be that than which a greater can be thought!” (p.94).

This absurdity is reached by assuming that Ng exists only in the understanding and showing that if it did, then it would not, by it being lesser than something which also exists in reality, be Ng. Therefore, Ng would be equal to ~Ng, which is a contradiction. And, through this logical reasoning, Anselm concludes that god must exist both in the understanding and in reality. For clarity, I will outline Anselm's argument below:

(1) God is something than which nothing greater can be thought (God is Ng).
(2) Ng is understood.
(3) Whatever is understood exists in the understanding.
(4) Whatever exists in the understanding either (a) exists in the understanding alone or (b) exists in both the understanding and in reality.
(5) It is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the understanding.
(6) Because of (4) and (5), Ng must exist both in the understanding and in reality, because if it did not, then Ng would be ~Ng.

2. Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool: In his reply, Guanilo presents a number of arguments that he sees as problematic for a proof of the existence of god as given by Anselm. Firstly, Gaunilo poses the question, “Could I not similarly be said to have in my understanding...all manner of unreal things that in no way actually exist?” (p.115). However, he quickly concedes this point and, for the purposes of the argument, assumes that Ng “...is not able to exist in thought in the same way as any unreal and doubtfully real things do.” (p.115).

The case in which Ng is not like other non-existent things that can be thought of, writes Gaunilo, is not like the relationship between a painter and his uncreated painting.

This is so because once one understands Ng, there can be no difference between having Ng in the understanding and understanding Ng to exist in reality also. Along these lines, Gaunilo asks, “For if this thing cannot [be thought not to exist], why was your entire argument enjoined against one who doubts or denies the there is any such nature as this?” (116).

In other words, if, as Anselm asserts, Ng must be understood by even the Fool (and once it is understood, it is at the same time, understood to exist both in the understanding and in reality) then what room is there for anyone who does not think that god exists? This point can, it seems, go both ways.

In one sense, this is precisely what Anselm is attempting to show- namely, that god can not be thought to not exist. However, if this is the case, and even the Fool can apprehend Ng, then how could there be any atheists and what purpose does Anselm's argument serve?

Gaunilo briefly returns to his earlier objection that having something in the understanding does not entail that such a thing exists in reality- precisely because all manner of unreal and dubiously real things can be understood.

Here, Gaunilo re-examines Anselm’s painter example and concludes that it is not relevant to Anselm’s argument because the painting, at one time, existed in the understanding of the painter, but not also in reality. But, in the case of Ng, the thing in question must have existed in reality prior to its existence in the understanding. Therefore, Ng is (again) not like the unpainted painting (p.116-117).

In the next section of his reply, Gaunilo addresses the point of whether or not Ng can actually be understood. He writes, “...upon hearing of that which is greater than all other than can be thought (which is said to be able to be no other than God Himself), I cannot think of this thing (or have it in the understanding) by reference to any object known to me through species or genus - just as in this way I also cannot think of God Himself (whom surely, for this reason, I can indeed think not to exist)” (p.117).

Gaunilo is referring to the concern that things can only be understood if there is already something we understand in our understanding that we can reference in order to form a representation of the thing in question. As god is “...such that there cannot be anything else similar to Him”, it seems impossible to refer to anything with a nature like that of god in order to form a representation of god (p.117).

In order to show how we can understand some things (but not Ng), Gaunilo imagines that he hears something about a man whom he has never met, and even wonders whether or not this man actually exists. In this case, Gaunilo writes, “I would be able to think of him [the stranger] by means of the specific or generic notion by which I know what a man is.” (p.117). And, even if this man turns out not to exist, states Gaunilo, it would have no bearing on the fact that he was able to conceive of this man “...by reference to the reality which any man is...” (p.117).

However, god, for Gaunilo, can not be like the stranger, as there is no empirical reality by which he can form a generic representation of such a being. He writes, “For although I can think of a non-existent man by reference to a real thing known to me, I cannot at all think of God except only with respect to the word.” (p.117).

As Gaunilo goes on to point out, when one hears a word, one does not normally think of the word itself (which he thinks is real), but what the word stands for. And, as the word ‘god’ stands for something, that is, by definition, incomprehensible, the word then lacks the representational quality that other words (such as ‘man’) have (p.117).

In the next section of his reply, Gaunilo re-examines to the notion that, even if Ng is understood, it has no bearing on the existence of Ng. He writes, “I do not concede to it [Ng] any other existence than that existence (if it should be called existence) present when the mind tries to represent to itself a thing completely unknown...” (p.118).

Again, he asserts that the concept of Ng is “...not even in my thought and understanding even in the way that numerous doubtfully real and uncertainly real things are.” (p.118). In the last line of this section, Gaunilo seems to make a tautologous remark about his epistemic certainty of Ng existing in reality.

He writes, “Indeed, I must first be made certain that this greater [than all others] exists somewhere in reality; only then will I find indubitable the claim that it exists (also) in reality because it is greater than all others.” (p.116). This seems to imply that Anselm’s argument, in essence, begs the question of the existence of Ng. Gaunilo does not think that a mental event can cause existence in reality. Therefore, Gaunilo argues, it must be the case that Anselm's argument really asserts that if Ng exists in reality then Ng exists in reality- which is only triivially true and hence, meaningless.

It is at this point in Gaunilo’s objections that he comes to the famous ‘Lost Island’ objection to Anselm’s argument. He supposes that this fabled isle “...abounds with [an] inestimable plentitude of riches and delights of all sorts...” (p.119). Such an island could be, according to Gaunilo, spoken of and understood.

He then inserts the Lost Island into a summarization of the argument presented by Anselm by replacing Ng with “...this island which is more excellent than all other lands.” (p.119). Gaunilo’s conclusion, then, using the substitution for Ng, is that the island must exist both in the understanding and in reality.

About this, Gaunilo remarks, “I would think he were jesting or else I would not know whom I ought to regard as the more foolish - either myself, were I to grant his argument, or him, were he to suppose that he had proved to any extent the existence of this island.” (p.119).

In the last portion of his reply to Anselm, Gaunilo states a number of interesting objections which were never clearly elaborated upon in the preceding portions of his argument. He writes, “Now, as for saying that this Supreme Being cannot be thought not to exist: one might more appropriately say that it cannot be understood not to exist and cannot be understood even to be able not to exist.

For properly speaking, unrealities can not be understood; but they can surely be thought - in the way that the Fool thought that God does not exist.” (p.120). There seems to be a problem in Gaunilo’s use of the terms ‘thought’ and ‘understood’ as semantically unequivalent.

Earlier, he wrote that “...I would easily understand what he said, for it [the Lost Island] is simple enough to comprehend.” (p.119). In the passage concerning the non-existent Lost Island, he seems to have no problem with understanding an unreality.

 


"God Forgiving the Devil" painting by Anthony Peter Iannini

"God Forgiving the Devil", 2006, by Anthony Peter Iannini

However, in the aforementioned definitions of the term ‘understood’ Gaunilo asserts that “unrealities can not be understood.” However, we may avoid this problem in noting that he beings this sentence by stating, “Properly speaking...”, which may denote a semantic preciseness that was not previously attempted. But there is still the problem of returning to Gaunilo’s former arguments with the notion that unrealities can not be understood, but only thought.

For, if this is so, how can he insert the Lost Island in place of Ng in Anselm’s argument, when a critical aspect of the argument is that the Lost Island (or Ng) be understood? Interpreting generously, we can assume that understanding takes on a new meaning in the last portion of Gaunilo’s reply (p.120). Thus, ‘understood’ must be synonymous with ‘conceptualized’. For, it seems difficult that we can conceptualize an unreality. However, the term ‘thought’ must be synonymous with ‘imagined’, which is the process of representing a possible state of affairs that is not actually the case.

In a line destined to appear centuries later in Rene Descartes’ philosophical writings, Gaunilo asserts that “...I know most certainly that I exist; yet I know no less certainly that I am able not to exist.” He goes on to assert that, like the certainty that he exists (from his own perspective), so too does he believe that god exists. But, even though it is indubitable that he does exist “...during the time when I know most certainly that I exist...” he wonders whether or not he can, during this time of certainty about the self, think that he does not exist.

If he can think that he does not exist, then it seems as though he can also think of other certainly existing things [such as god] as not existing (which makes them rather uncertain). And, conversely, if he can not think that he does not exist, “...then this [property of not being able to be thought not to exist] will no longer be uniquely God’s." (p.120).

3. Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo: Anselm begins his reply to Gaunilo by stating, “...if Ng is not understood or thought and is not in the understanding or in thought, then surely either (1) God is not Ng or else (2) He is not understood or thought and is not in the understanding or in thought.” (p.123). As to the certainty of (1) and (2), Anselm points to “...faith and conscience as the strongest indicators of how false these [(1) and (2)] inferences are.” (p.123).

In summarizing the objections raised by Gaunilo, Anselm interprets Gaunilo as arguing that having understood Ng does not imply having Ng in the understanding. However, it does not seem as though Gaunilo makes this assertion. Rather, he wonders whether or not we can understand Ng in the first place. If it is the case, as Gaunilo argues, that Ng can not be understood because it can not be generalized from anything empirical, then it can never be in the understanding.

Anselm then states what he sees as the second of Gaunilo’s objections. “Or if it Ng is in the understanding, there does not follow, you claim, that it exists in reality.” (p.123). To this objection, Anselm replies with a conditional assertion: If Ng can even be thought to exist, then, it is necessary that Ng exists.

However, Anselm seems to be disregarding the objection that Ng can not be thought to exist for precisely the reasons Gaunilo presented. At each instance where Anselm states that Ng must exist, he bases this claim upon assumptions that are the antecedents of conditional propositions such as “...if it [Ng] can be though to exist” and “...if indeed it [Ng] can even be thought...” (p.124).

To the objection that Ng can not be thought of or understood in the first place, Anselm writes, “...one who does not understand [what he hears] has little or no intelligence” (p.125). Anselm seems to think that the concept of Ng is so clear as to be able to be understood by anyone of even moderate intelligence.

In the next section of his reply to Gaunilo, Anselm objects to the ‘Lost Island’ example. He writes, “If besides Ng anyone finds for me anything else (whether existing in reality or only in thought) to which he can apply the logic of my argument, then I will find and will make him a present of that lost island - no longer to be lost.” (p.126). Here, Anselm’s objection to Gaunilo’s reasoning appears valid. There is only one thing that can be inserted into the logical argument that Anselm formulates, and that is Ng. Because something can be thought of that surpasses the excellence of the island, the island is not Ng.

Anselm then goes on to distinguish what it is to imagine that something does not exist, even though we know that, in fact, it does exist. He states of the knowledge of the existence of the self, “...you can think that you do not exist even while knowing most certainly that you do exist.” (p.128). In order to interpret this passage, we must return to the definition of ‘thought’ that it seems Gaunilo presented towards the end of his reply. ‘Thought’ (as opposed to understanding) must mean a representing of a possible state of affairs.

Otherwise, Anselm would be asserting that, when we are certain that we exist, we can really understand what it would be for us to not exist- which seems impossible. To clarify terminology, Anselm makes a distinction between thinking as (a) imagining another state of affairs in which, something that we know exists, does not exist, and thinking as (b) imagining something to exist and not exist at the same time. While (a) is wholly possible, (b) is impossible. However, Anselm asserts that Ng is the one thing that we can not think of even in the way (a) defines thoughts of non-existent things.

In response to Gaunilo’s objection that Ng can not be understood (in the way that ‘man’ can be understood), Anselm appears to alter his argument. He writes that, when someone hears of Ng, it is understood “...to some extent.” (p.131). This somewhat weaker version of what it is to understand Ng is a reaction to the notion that complete knowledge of god is impossible. Anselm writes, “...is it not easier to prove what in some sense is understood than what is not at all understood?” (p.131).

Again, Anselm backs away from there being a complete understanding of Ng, and attempts to separate Ng from the meaning of the word ‘God’, as god is something which the Fool (and he himself) can not, by definition, understand.

“For he [the Fool] might not at all understand the word ‘God,’ but he would to some extent understand the description.” (p.132). Anselm then defends his example of the painter and his painting by arguing that the entire illustration was used only to show that it is possible for something to be thought to exist in the understanding and not in reality- which is a condition in his proof for the existence of god.

In response to Gaunilo’s objection that Ng can not be understood, Anselm argues that Ng can be understood by appealing to the notion of "goodness". He writes, "...it is clear that by ascending from lesser goods to higher goods, we can indeed pass from conceiving of that Good than which nothing greater can be thought." (p.132).

Anselm appears to think that by understanding the concept of human good, we can imagine what it would be for something to be a greater good than anything else. And, by reference to this generic concept, we can form an understanding of god. In this way, Anselm attempts to provide an analogous counterexample to Gaunilo's illustration of how one comes to have a generic understanding of a 'man'.

4. Analysis of the Debate and the Nature of Existence: In his Reply on Behalf of the Fool, Gaunilo questions whether or not Ng can actually be conceived. Anselm's argument begins with the assumption that god is "something than which nothing greater can be thought" (p.93). There are two problems with this definition.

Firstly, Anselm appears to be defining that which, by definition, is undefinable. In the view of St. Thomas Aquinas, Anselm's argument fails precisely because Anselm has defined god's essence. In much the same way Gaunilo argues for how we can have knowledge of things, Aquinas writes "...our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our intellect cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God... Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known."2.

Parallel to Gaunilo's example of the unmet stranger being known by a generic empirical representation of any man, Aquinas argues that all knowledge of things must originate in the senses. And, as the senses can not perceive god's essence, there is no way for Anselm (or anyone else) to define god's essence as such.

The second problem related to the definition of god as Ng concerns whether or not finite minds can actually comprehend what it is to be Ng. Anselm backs away from a stringent view of comprehending Ng in his reply to Gaunilo. He does this, it seems, so that he can avoid the problem of asserting that we can know god- as this would be, in a strict sense, impossible.

Though humans can have a functional understanding of infinity (as in mathematics), it is questionable whether or not any finite mind can truly comprehend infinity. And, with this said, it is dubious whether or not we can conceive of god by using our concept of human good and abstracting such a concept towards infinite goodness- which is Anselm's answer to the problem of comprehending god.

If, however, we allow the assumption that Ng can be understood, more severe problems arise for Anselm's argument.

Anselm's third assumption is that if Ng is understood then it exists in the understanding. This is followed by his fourth assumption that whatever exists in the understanding must either exist only in the understanding or in both the understanding and in reality.

Anselm's division of existence into the mental and the real is never objected to by Gaunilo in his reply. It appears to make intuitive sense that there are mental things such as numbers and unicorns, and real things such as tables and trees.

However, in the special case of Ng, Anselm is willing to make the leap from mental reality to real reality- though he does not seem to want to say that the mental existence of god causes the real existence of god.

This leads into one of the central problems that arises in Anselm's analytic conception of Ng. To highlight this problem, imagine a square and its property of having four sides of equal length.

The property of having four sides of equal length is contained in the definition of 'square' just as existence is contained in the definition of Ng. This means that if there is a square, then it will necessarily have four sides of equal length.

 
graphic drawing of St. Anselm for the God existence and ontological argument page at hiartx.com

"St. Anselm", 2010, graphic drawing by Anthony Peter Iannini

Similarly, this means that if there is Ng, then it will necessarily exist. If one asserts that there exists a square that does not have four sides of equal length, one has committed a contradiction.

Similarly, if one asserts that there exists Ng, and Ng does not exist, one has committed an even more blatant contradiction. However, there is no contradiction involved in asserting that if no squares exist then there is nothing that has four sides of equal length. Similarly again, there is no contradiction in asserting, as does the atheist, that Ng does not exist and there is nothing that necessarily exists.

Kant, in his analysis of the ontological argument writes "To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise."3.

The aforementioned problem attacks Anselm's argument on its own terms. But, there is an even deeper problem related to the nature of existence. When we speak of something having the property of existence, it appears that we are making a tautologous claim.

Imagine that someone makes the following proposition (A) "The ball is red".

Proposition (A) is logically equivalent to the statement (A1) "There is some thing x, such that x is a ball and x is red" and proposition (A) is also logically equivalent to the symbolic notation (A2) "(existential quantifierx)(Bx & Rx)". Being a ball and being red are properties of the thing in question and there is nothing suspect or redundant at all in these statements.

However, imagine that someone makes the following proposition (B) "The ball exists".

Proposition (B) is logically equivalent to the statement (B1) "There is some thing x, such that x is a ball and x exists" and proposition (B) is also logically equivalent to the symbolic notation (B2) "(existential quantifierx)(Bx & Ex)". Stating that there is a ball and that it also exists is attributing an already necessary property to it. Existence can not be a property added to that which already is.

The redundancy occurs when prior to describing the ball's property of existence, we assert the existence of the thing in question by using the word 'is'. Therefore, claiming that 'god necessarily exists' or "(existential quantifierx)(Gx & necessityEx)" becomes a very odd claim which means "There is some thing x, such that x is god and x necessarily exists".

Things can not necessarily exist without first existing- which defeats the purpose of the claim. Again, Kant is supportive of this understanding of what it means to exist. He writes, "'Being' is obviously not a real predicate: that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely a positing of a thing, or of certain demonstrations, as existing in themselves."4.

5. A View of Reality that Allows Anselm's Argument to Succeed: Anselm makes explicit the distinction between existence in the mind and existence in reality. However, if we adopt a Kantian conception of things not being able to be predicated by existence, there is still a lingering problem. If there is no distinction between mental existence and real existence (as things can not be coherently said to exist or not exist), can Anselm's argument succeed? If existence is lost as a redundant property, it becomes impossible to make a distinction between what exists in the mind and what exists in reality.

The question of whether or not something exists, then, becomes a meaningless question. The question "Does god exist?" falls victim to the fact that existence can not be a property of anything. It is, then, the case that everything exists. And, everything must mean all objects of perception. Further, all objects of perception must include everything- colors, planets, sounds, tables, people, numbers, unicorns, and god.

Whether something appears to exist mentally or in reality becomes merely an illusion of our coherent epistemological system. Normally, we do not think that our idea of a unicorn and our idea of the chair in which we sit correspond to the same type of things.

But, our functional understanding of the nature of reality as separated into two distinct kinds (mental and real) does not have any bearing on the actuality of reality. We think that to hypothesize a physical and reality is the most plausible hypothesis for explaining the cause of our ideas. However, upon further examination, it appears that we are not in a position to speak about the cause(s) of our ideas.

Bertrand Russell's concept of sense-data5, accompanied by a Kantian notion of existence, seems to create an ideal world. Ideal in the sense that everything becomes, in some sense, mental.

Russell writes, "Berkeley was right in treating sense-data which constitute our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the tree were not being perceived."6. Sense-data, then, would not exist if there was no mind to perceive it. What would remain could not even be spoken about or thought about. Therefore, what remains does not (in the sense that I am referring to) exist.

To even speak of substance existing independently of the mind falls victim again to the aforementioned analysis7. Because, as has already been argued, if there is no distinction between mental and real reality, then nothing can exist independently of the mind. There is simply one type of existence, one that is a symbiotic relationship between the mind and the cause of the mind's ideas (whatever that may be).

And, to even speak of the thing in itself, whether it be in reference to the mind or the cause of the mind's ideas, we commit errors in language. Therefore to claim that "matter exists" is to make a claim about our idea of matter and nothing more.

Even if it is true that material substance is the cause of the mind's ideas, we can never know that it exists. That there is something separate from the mind requires the hypothetization of a mind. To say that, for instance, the big bang occurred, is to make a hypothetical claim about what an observer would have observed, had there been an observer of such and such a kind.

It must be conceded that Anselm did not intend to prove the existence of god in an ideal reality. However, his argument's success seems to require that there not be a distinction between mental and real existence. And, because god is something, it is true that god exists in an ideal world.

References:
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1 All page numbers in parenthesis refer to pages in: Anselm, Saint, Archbishop of Canterbury, Anselm of Canterbury, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1975), Volume I (included in this volume is the text of Gaunilo's Reply on Behalf of the Fool and Anselm's Reply back to Gaunilo).

2 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica I, question 12, article 12, in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), p 109.

3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), sec. A595/B623, p 580.

4 Ibid. sec. A598/B626, p 583.

5 Russell held that empirical knowledge is based upon direct acquaintance with sense-data. At one time, he viewed the existence of matter as the best explanation of sense-data, though only postulated the existence of substance independent of the mind.

Later, in his Analysis of Matter, Russell's view became neutral to the existence of the world or the mind. (Abstracted from: Betrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford UP 1997) & The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, "Bertrand Russell" entry by Nicholas Griffin and David B. Martens, (Cambridge UP 1995), p 701.

6 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford UP 1997), p 41.

7 And, in the following lines, the problem of speaking of existence independently of the mind becomes nearly impossible without breaking some of the existential linguistic rules previously set. This, I hope, lends itself to the view that the existence of non-existent things can not be properly spoken about.


 


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