Breaking the Cartesian Circle: An Analysis of Descartes’ System of Knowledge
by Anthony Peter Iannini | last edited: 06.11.2011 | originally written: 1999 |
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Essay Overview:
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This medium-lengthed essay examines Descartes' cartesian circle or the apparent circular reasoning in his argument for why humans can have stable knowledge about reality. In the following essay, I have attempted to show Descartes' quotations in a light green color and his objector's quotations in a light blue color for clarity. Section headings are written in bold salmon.
Most of what follows was derived from the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch work, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, known as the CSM volumes, 1984, vols. 1–3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
0. Introduction: Throughout his writings, Descartes attempts to form a coherent system of attaining knowledge and certainty about both past and present perceptions of the world. The Cartesian Circle refers to the apparent circularity with which Descartes lays down the initial portions of this philosophical system in the Meditations and in the Principles of Philosophy.
Before outlining the argument of the Cartesian Circle, I will examine two crucial aspects of Descartes’ philosophical system: Certainty and God. Then, I will illustrate my interpretation of the Cartesian Circle and what I define as Cartesian Paralysis. Finally, I will provide an interpretation which seeks to "break" the circular reasoning attributed to Descartes.
1. The Cogito: Descartes begins his metaphysical journey by ridding himself of all his preconceived notions and asserting that he must be a thinking thing. Even in the face of an omnipotent, evil demon, Descartes realizes that “he [the demon] will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.”(CSM II 17). For Descartes, this basic intuitive idea is so obvious, so impossible to doubt, that it seems a sturdy foundation on which to build a model of reality.
Even if one doubts one’s existence, one is still doubting, which is just another mode of thinking. And it seems impossible for us not to attach thinking to something. In other words, it would impossible for nothing to be thinking. With this indubitable intuition in hand, Descartes can assert the first person statement, “I think therefore I am”. There are a number of strong textual examples that support this view, such as the one found in the Second Set of Replies:
Now some of these perceptions are so transparently clear and at the same time so simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to be true. The fact that I exist so long as I am thinking...we can never doubt them (CSM II 104).
Here, Descartes is asserting that we can never think of perceptions like the Cogito and be capable of doubting them. Also, in the Third Meditation, Descartes states:
Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something (CSM II 25).
We can be sure that perceptions such as the Cogito, and possibly others, are independently certain, because no matter the circumstances, we must believe them to be true. Such propositions are psychologically certain, but not absolutely certain. The distinction between these two degrees of certainty is made by Descartes in the Second Set of Replies:
What is it to us that someone may make it out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this “absolute falsity” bother us, since we neither believe in it or have even the smallest suspicion of it? For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty (CSM II 103).
Here, Descartes refers to the possibility that certain propositions which seem utterly evident and certain to us, may in fact be false in the eyes of “God or an angel”. Because Descartes’ God is omnipotent, he could plausibly make 2 + 2 equal 5 instead of 4. However, regardless of the absolute truth of 2 + 2, we will always believe, with “the most perfect certainty” that 2 + 2 will result in 4. In other words, we are psychologically convinced of certain propositions, such as those involved in simple mathematics and the Cogito.
At this point, it appears as though there are certain propositions that we must believe. The Cogito is one of these indubitable propositions. Descartes makes a distinction between absolute and psychological certainty, the latter of which is the highest level of certainty which we can hope to attain. And, as put forth by Harry Frankfurt, whether or not indubitable propositions correspond to reality is irrelevant to Descartes because only God (or an angel) can be certain about the true nature of reality1.
2. Can an Atheist be Certain of the Cogito?: The next step in understanding Descartes and the problem of the Cartesian Circle is to examine the possible uncertainty of the Cogito when we have no prior knowledge of God. As John Cottingham asserts, God plays a central role in moving from cognitio (mere cognition) towards scientia (stable knowledge)2. This shift from fleeting thoughts to knowledge comes about when Descartes understands the nature of the supreme being.
His God, like many notions of the supreme being during the time, is omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent, eternal, and the creator of all things (CSM II 28). The benevolence of God in Descartes’ system is of utmost importance. Without an awareness of God’s quality of infinite goodness, one could be in doubt about whether or not one’s nature is defective, because God could be a deceiver. With an awareness of an infinitely good deity, one must believe that one’s nature is sound. In support of this view, Descartes writes:
As for the kind of knowledge possessed by the atheist, it is easy to demonstrate that it is not immutable and certain. As I have stated previously, the less power the atheist attributes to the author of his being, the more reason he will have to suspect that his nature may be so imperfect as to allow him to be deceived even in matters which seem utterly evident to him. And he will never be able to be free of this doubt until he recognizes that he has been created by a true God who cannot be a deceiver (CSM II 289).
Here, Descartes makes the claim that anyone who has not gained an awareness of God has not gained an understanding of their own nature. Therefore, the atheist3 is forced to consider whether or not his nature is defective, which would result in him being “deceived even in matters which seem utterly evident to him.” The question that then arises, and must be thoroughly examined, is “Can an atheist be certain of the Cogito?”.
The above passage poses problems for Descartes’ notion of certainty. If we return to the Second Meditation, where the Cogito is first presented, there is no mention of knowledge of God. In fact, the evil demon is used to show that nothing could make the Cogito doubtful. Yet, in the above passage, Descartes seems to be asserting that we could be deceived even in “utterly evident” matters, unless we first recognize the “author” of our being. There is further evidence against the certainty of evident propositions, such as the Cogito, when we have not first come to know the author of our being:
It is certain, however, that we will never mistake the false for the true provided we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive. I say this is certain, because God is not a deceiver, and so the faculty of perception which he has given us cannot incline to falsehood... (CSM I 207).
Descartes is asserting that, if we use our faculties of perception correctly (only assenting to those perceptions that are both clear and distinct) then we will never go wrong because God would not endow us with a defective “faculty of perception” because this would be in conflict with the infinite goodness of the supreme being.
As for the atheist, he must wonder about the nature of his “faculty of perception” because he has no knowledge of his faculty’s origin (namely, a benevolent God). Also, in the Second Set of Objections and Replies, Descartes states:
Hence you see that once we have become aware that God exists it is necessary for us to imagine that he is a deceiver if we wish to cast doubt on what we clearly and distinctly perceive. And since it is impossible to imagine that he is a deceiver, whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive must be completely accepted as true and certain (CSM II 103).
Here Descartes is again buttressing the notion that God is not a deceiver, and hence his faculties of perception are sound, provided he uses them correctly. Only by imagining that God is not completely benevolent could we ever doubt the soundness of our nature. But, says Descartes, “...it is impossible to imagine that he [God] is a deceiver.”
Why Descartes thinks that it is impossible to even consider whether or not God is a deceiver is puzzling. In the Second Meditation, Descartes entertains the notion of a deceptive deity in order to reinforce the certainty of the Cogito when he states, “But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me” (CSM II 17). In the Third Meditation, Descartes writes: |
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...perhaps some God could have given me a nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident. And whenever my preconceived belief in the supreme power of God comes to mind, I cannot but admit that it would be easy for him, if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind’s eye (CSM II 25).
The fact that Descartes does not entertain this deceptive deity in the Principles of Philosophy may indicate that his use of the “deceiver of supreme power” may have only been for purely experimental reasons. However, it is evident that Descartes can and does at least have some concept of the power and possibility of a deceptive deity early on.
At this point, it is important to return to the question of whether or not an atheist can be certain of the Cogito. It seems very reasonable to attribute Descartes with a sort of temporary atheism until the middle of the Third Meditation4 because he states, “I do not yet even know for sure whether there is a God at all...” (CSM II 25).
Now, if Descartes is not sure about the existence of God at this point, he must not have been sure about the existence of God during the Second Meditation5, where he asserts the Cogito and the certainty of the notion that he is, or that he is thinking. Therefore, an atheist can be certain of the Cogito, or as psychologically certain as anyone can be about anything. In other words, the atheist can be as certain as the theist6 that he is a thinking thing.
In summary at this point, the Cogito began as something unable to be doubted, or psychologically certain. Then, evidence was presented for the contrary position that the Cogito relies on knowledge of God. This evidence, though substantial, is ambiguous in relation to what can be found in the early parts of the Meditations where Descartes is both certain of the Cogito and an plays the role of an atheist at the same time. There are two incompatible lines of thought being presented in Descartes’ writing:
(a) Evident perceptions are intrinsically certain.
(b) No perceptions are intrinsically certain7.
If we take (a) to be the line that Descartes takes, then the Cogito and other “utterly evident” perceptions are certain solely by their nature. In other words, when one considers the Cogito or a simple mathematical formula, one must believe them to be true (disregarding the absolute nature of reality that only God or an angel could have knowledge of).
If we take (b) to be the line that Descartes takes, then the Cogito and other “utterly evident” perceptions must rely on an understanding of God (and his benevolence) thereby guaranteeing our “faculties of perception”. Because Descartes reached the certainty of the Cogito without the use or knowledge of God or God’s benevolent nature, it appears as though (a) is the only plausible way in which we can interpret what Descartes means. As perplexing as it may seem, in Section 43 of Part One of the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes affirms both (a) and (b):
It is certain, however, that we will never mistake the false for the true provided we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive. I say this is certain, because God is not a deceiver, and so the faculty of perception which he has given us cannot incline to falsehood. And even if there were no way of proving this, the minds of all of us have been so molded by nature that whenever we perceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our assent to it and are quite unable to doubt its truth (CSM I 207).
The beginning of Section 43 seems to deny that clear and distinct perception can be at fault in light of the existence of a benevolent God and hence there is evidentiary support for (b). Then, the argument shifts to the notion humans must, by their “nature”, give their “assent” to those things that are clearly perceived, which affirms (a).
Descartes adds this clause (beginning with “And even if...”) which states that it is irrelevant if there is a God or not, because we can not doubt clear and distinct perceptions because our “minds have been so molded by nature”. Again, in the above section, Descartes provides an argument for clear and distinct perceptions as incapable of being doubted and an argument for clear and distinct perceptions as resting on the awareness of God. I outline Section 43 as follows:
(1) Clear and distinct perception is always true.
(2) We know (1) because God is not a deceiver.
(3) If (1) and (2) are false, we must believe clear and distinct perceptions anyway.
It seems as though Descartes has covered all of his bases in this Principle that sets the stage for a further elaboration and analysis of clear and distinct perception. In (3) Descartes, in a sense, overrides (1) and (2), in that they become irrelevant when we consider that we must believe clear and distinct perceptions anyway. This forces the question, “If evident perceptions are intrinsically certain, then what is God’s role?”
3. God’s Role in Stable Knowledge: In the Third Meditation Descartes states, “so I now seem8 to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true”(CSM II 24). In making this claim, Descartes is stating that it is impossible to doubt the truth of clear and distinct perceptions9.
This does not mean, however, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is absolutely true10. Rather, this means that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is psychologically true. Louis Loeb has defined the above statement (which begins, “so I now seem...”) as the truth rule, noting the relevance of clear and distinct perception in Descartes’ system11.
In keeping with the line of reasoning that I have previously attributed to Descartes, the truth rule will apply to all clear and distinct perceptions considered by anyone (regardless of their theological understanding). In other words, as humans, we are all compelled to believe simple and utterly evident propositions such as the Cogito and basic mathematical demonstrations.
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However, this is the point at which there is a divergence in Descartes’ understanding of the atheist and the theist. This distinction is most evident when we examine how Descartes responds to criticisms of his system. The following objection, from Mersenne, attacks the notion that one needs to know that God exists before one can be certain of clear and distinct perceptions:
Thirdly, you are not yet certain of the existence of God, and you say that you are not certain of anything, and cannot know anything clearly and distinctly until you have achieved clear and certain knowledge of the existence of God.
It follows from this that you do not clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, on your own admission, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledge of an existing God; and this you have not yet proved in the passage where you draw the conclusion that you clearly know what you are (CSM II 89).
Mersenne raises two points. Firstly, he raises the idea that Descartes can not achieve a clear and distinct perception of anything until he has a clear and distinct understanding of God.
Secondly, Mersenne raises the idea that Descartes can not know that he is a thinking thing at the beginning of the Second Meditation, because this would be based firstly upon the knowledge of God, which has not yet been proven. Descartes replies by stating:
Thirdly, when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to those arguments by means of which we deduced them. Now awareness of first principles is not normally called “knowledge” by dialecticians...When someone says “I am thinking, therefore I am, or exist”, he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind (CSM II 100). |
Here, Descartes attempts to escape Mersenne’s charges by distinguishing “knowledge” from “first principles”. Knowledge, as Descartes defines it in the above passage, is the resulting conclusions of past arguments that can be recalled without repeating the steps of the argument. First Principles, on the other hand, are "self-evident" products of a "simple intuition of the mind".
Based on these definitions, we could categorize the conclusion of a lengthy analysis of Shakespeare’s Macbeth12 as knowledge, while the Cogito would be an example of a first principle. Based on this understanding of the different positions of the atheist and the theist, Descartes is asserting the following:
(i) Atheists can be aware of first principles, but they can not have knowledge.
(ii) Theists can be aware of first principles, and they can have knowledge.
The conclusion that can be easily drawn from (i) and (ii) is that awareness of God is a requirement for knowledge13. The reason for the necessity of this awareness of God is evident in another objection by Mersenne:
When the atheist asserts “If equals are taken from equals the remainders will be equal”... and numerous similar propositions, he maintains his knowledge is very certain and indeed - on your own criterion - utterly evident. For he cannot think of these propositions without believing them to be wholly certain... Moreover he maintains that no reason for doubt can be presented to him which could shake him in the slightest or make him at all uncertain. What reason can you produce? That God, if he exists, may deceive him? (CSM II 279).
Here, Mersenne raises the objection that very simple mathematical truths, such as “equals taken from equals will result in equal remainders” are utterly evident to atheists. It seems as though this example borders between knowledge and a first principle, in that it requires very little thought and has a simple conclusion, derived from simple premises. However, Descartes treats Mersenne’s “equals...” example as knowledge in the following passage:
As for the kind of knowledge possessed by the atheist, it is easy to demonstrate that it is not immutable and certain. As I have stated previously, the less power the atheist attributes to the author of his being, the more reason he will have to suspect that his nature may be so imperfect as to allow him to be deceived even in matters which seem utterly evident to him. And he will never be able to be free of this doubt until he recognizes that he has been created by a true God who cannot be a deceiver (CSM II 289).
Based on this dialogue, I can expand the conclusion reached from (i) and (ii) above. This conclusion is that, for Descartes, awareness of God is a requirement for knowledge because God ensures that one’s nature is sound.
4. Arriving at An Awareness of God’s Existence and the Cartesian Circle: At this point, I have not yet examined exactly how Descartes arrives at an awareness of God’s existence, and hence, gains the ability to acquire stable knowledge. I have waited until this point in my examination of Descartes’ system because knowledge of God poses a problem. This problem is where I believe the Cartesian Circle is capable of being completed.
As I have sought to demonstrate, clear and distinct perceptions are independent of God, hence the truth rule applies to both atheists and theists. However, knowledge is something that only the theist can attain. The problem is that the theist appears to need knowledge to be aware of God, and awareness of God in order to have knowledge. In the Fourth Set of Objections, compiled by Arnauld, the most evident and direct objection to the circularity of Descartes’ reasoning appears:
I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists. But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly and distinctly perceive this. Hence, before we can be sure that God exists, we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly and evidently is true (CSM II 150).
Arnauld’s objection is directed at the certainty of clear and distinct perceptions. This objection does not directly attack what I have demonstrated to be the central problem of the Cartesian Circle. Although it may seem that God’s purpose in the Meditations (and elsewhere) is to validate clear and distinct perceptions, I take the problem to be somewhat more complex.
The real difficulty is the holding on to, or the remembrance of the conclusions reached using clear and distinct perception (such as in the example of forming a conclusion about Shakespeare’s Macbeth). This underlying problem, of acquiring stable knowledge, is referred to by Descartes in his reply to Arnauld:
Lastly, as to the fact that I was not guilty of circularity when I said that the only reason we have for being sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true is the fact that God exists, but that we are sure that God exists only because we perceive this clearly: I have already given an adequate explanation of this point in my reply to the Second Objections, under the headings Thirdly and Fourthly, where I made a distinction between what we in fact perceive clearly and what we remember having perceived clearly on a previous occasion.
To begin with, we are sure that God exists because we attend to the arguments which prove this; but subsequently it is enough for us to remember that we perceived something clearly in order for us to be certain that it is true. This would not be sufficient if we did not know that God exists and is not a deceiver (CSM II 171).
In the above reply, Descartes implies the distinction between first principles and knowledge (which was previously14 made). In this passage, first principles are “what we in fact perceive clearly”. I take these perceptions to be independent of an awareness of God. In contrast, knowledge is “what we remember having perceived clearly on a previous occasion”. I take these perceptions to be dependent on an awareness of God.
After Descartes makes this distinction, which is consistent with the interpretation I have so far put forth, he uses reasoning that appears highly problematic to explain an awareness of God. The argument starts with the line in the above passage, “To begin with, we are...”. I outline Descartes’ argument as follows:
(a) We prove God’s existence by clearly perceiving the relevant arguments15.
(b) If we remember that we perceived something clearly, then it is certain.
(c) But, we could not know (b) without first knowing (a).
The problem arises when we consider the distinction between first principles and knowledge. Knowledge, as I have shown Descartes to define it, is the sum of recalled conclusions from past arguments. Knowledge is not simple, clear, and immediate, as are first principles. In the above reconstruction of Descartes’ argument, it appears that knowledge of (a) depends on knowledge of (b).
However, the inverse of this dilemma is also true. It appears that we can not arrive at knowledge of (b) until we have knowledge of (a) as Descartes himself realizes in the last sentence of the above passage, beginning with, “This would not be sufficient...”. This situation is exemplary of circular reasoning, and demonstrative of the Cartesian Circle.
At this point, I think Descartes can possibly avoid the problem of circularity by asserting that an awareness of God is similar to the Cogito or other such first principles. If the idea of God were reached through a simple, clear and distinct perception, then there would be no need to have prior validation of one’s nature.
There is textual evidence for this interpretation, in which Descartes would be capable of escaping circularity. However, I would like to present the textual evidence that does lend itself to circularity before presenting a interpretation that escapes problematic reasoning. In the following letter to Mersenne, Descartes seems ambiguous about an awareness of God:
The shortest way I know to reply to all the arguments of the atheists, is to find an evident proof which will make everyone believe that there is a God. I can boast of having found one myself which satisfies me entirely, and which makes me know that there is a God with more certainty than I know the truth of any proposition of geometry.16
Although the conclusion about the existence of God that Descartes reached may be more certain than “any proposition of geometry” it is still the fact that Descartes is utilizing a “proof” which, by its very nature, requires a reasoned argument. Again, the problem is that an awareness of the existence of God requires knowledge, and knowledge itself is only validated after an awareness of God. Descartes further attributes arguments and proofs as the way in which to reach an awareness of the existence of God throughout his correspondence. In the letter to Silhon, Descartes writes:
...I have not yet expounded, in a manner that everyone can easily grasp, the arguments by which I think I can prove that there is nothing at all so evident and certain in itself as the existence of God and the human soul. But I did not dare to try to do so, since I would have had to explain at length the strongest arguments of the skeptics to show that there is no material thing of whose existence we can be certain.17
Here, Descartes realizes that the proofs for the existence of God are complex. He goes on in the letter to Silhon to describe the process by which he could demonstrate an awareness of God to someone. This process is parallel to the one found in the Meditations, and is certainly not “self-evident” or a “simple intuition” of the mind as a first principle would necessarily be.18 Another response of Descartes, perhaps one of the most problematic, comes in the letter to Vatier:
The certainty and evidence of my kind of argument for the existence of God cannot really be known without a distinct memory of the arguments which display the uncertainty of all our knowledge of material things...19
In the above passage, Descartes is explicitly defining his argument for the existence of God as a form of knowledge, or a conclusion that can be recalled from past arguments. If it is the case that awareness of God can only be arrived at through a series of arguments, or a proof, then Descartes can be charged with circular reasoning.
Presently, I have shown that Descartes distinguishes first principles and knowledge. Arrival at an awareness of God requires an argument. Conclusions derived from past arguments that are recalled with certainty are stable knowledge. But, this stable knowledge can not exist (for Descartes) until an awareness of God has first been reached. Hence, the Cartesian Circle has come full circle, which I summarize as follows:
(i) stable knowledge requires an awareness of God.
(ii) awareness of God requires stable knowledge.
There seems no room for dispute about (i), as Descartes himself states, “...we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists...” (CSM II 100). However, (ii) is more open to debate. As I have attempted to show, Descartes uses arguments to prove the existence of God, rather than rely on a simple, “self-evident”, first principle. Throughout the Third Meditation, Descartes attempts, in various ways, to prove the existence of God through arguments.
He uses such arguments as the “at least as much <reality> in efficient cause and total cause as in the effect” (CSM II 28) and that “...there is more reality in an infinite substance than a finite one, and hence my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is myself.” (CSM II 31).
These arguments do not immediately seem to be simple and self-evident. In contrast, it seems unlikely that a first principle would necessitate a proof. In the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes writes: |
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Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something; or make it true at some future time that I have never existed, since it is now true that I exist; or bring it about that two and three added together are more or less than five, or anything of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction. And since I have no cause to think that there is a deceiving God, and I do not yet even know for sure whether there is a God at all...” (CSM II 25).
Obviously, an awareness of the existence of God is not like the Cogito, and is not like simple mathematical demonstrations (such as 2 + 2 = 4). Therefore, an awareness of God seems to rely on a type of knowledge, or a number of conclusions that must be remembered in order to initially prove the existence of God.
For example, when Descartes attempts the “as much cause in the effect” proof of the existence of God, many separate steps must be made, and conclusions much be reached at each step. Then, during the proceeding part of the proof, the conclusion must be recalled to continue the proof, as in the following proof in the Third Meditation. I point out, in parenthesis, where past conclusions are referred to in the following paragraph:
It is quite clear that there is as much cause as in the effect (recalled past conclusion). And therefore whatever kind of cause is evidently proposed, since I am a thinking thing (recalled past conclusion) and have within me some idea of God (recalled past conclusion), it must be admitted that what caused me is itself a thinking thing and possess the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God (recalled past conclusion). (CSM II 34).
That there are approximately four past, recalled, conclusions used in this particular proof for the existence of God (and this is one of the relatively brief ones). As defined by Descartes himself, knowledge is “...those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to those arguments by means of which we deduced them.” (CSM II 100). Descartes, in attempting to prove the existence of God, is using knowledge that has not yet been validated by the existence of God.
At this point, what I call Cartesian Paralysis is applicable, and requires explanation. As I have sought to demonstrate, “self-evident”, simple “intuitions of the mind” that Descartes refers to as "first principles" can be perceived independently of God with as much psychological certainty as is possible. However, there are severe problems with acquiring knowledge. If, as it seems currently, there is no way of attaining scientia, or “stable knowledge”, then all we are left with are fleeting, simple, first principles.
And, with only first principles, we are left mentally paralyzed; unable to be certain of conclusions derived from past arguments. In effect, the only way for one to keep a conclusion in mind is to try to hold it before one’s mind, constantly. It seems implausible that Descartes would have asserted that many first principles could be considered simultaneously, as Descartes himself states that “...the mind cannot think of a large number of things at the same time.” (CSM 335).
5. Breaking the Cartesian Circle: Previously, I have demonstrated how the Cartesian Circle can be completed. Now, I will examine an interpretation that I think can acquit Descartes of circularity from both a logical and textual standpoint. Previously, I outlined the problem of the Cartesian Circle as follows:
(i) stable knowledge requires an awareness of God.
(ii) awareness of God requires stable knowledge.
As previously demonstrated, (i) is asserted strongly and unambiguously by Descartes.20 However, there is substantial textual evidence for the interpretation in which (ii) is not true, but rather an awareness of God requires only current clear and distinct perception, which is, for Descartes, intrinsically certain. I outline the case I will attempt to make as follows:
(1) clear and distinct perception is intrinsically certain.
(2) memory is uncertain (therefore, knowledge21 is uncertain).
(3) one reaches an awareness of God using (1) and not (2).
(4) memory is validated (therefore, knowledge is validated).
The above argument has been termed the memory thesis22 or the memory defense23 in the relevant literature. Harry G. Frankfurt attacks this interpretation, stating that those who support the memory thesis mistakenly claim that:
Descartes makes no attempt to determine whether what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true. He is only interested, according to them [those who endorse the memory thesis], in providing grounds for trusting recollections of what has been clearly and distinctly perceived.24
Firstly, it certainly appears, on my interpretation, that Descartes is not interested in the truth of clear and distinct perceptions. Clear and distinct perception, as Frankfurt himself states, is “an activity of the reason. It is what the faculty of reason does when it is at its best.”25 What more could one want than the best possible mental faculty? Descartes asserts that truth (as opposed to certainty) is not a goal of his philosophy:
What is it to us that someone may make it out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this "absolute falsity" bother us, since we neither believe in it or have even the smallest suspicion of it? For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty (CSM II 103).
Here, Descartes is asserting that it is certainty and not truth that he is pursuing, because (as he implies by making a contrast with infinite beings), as finite beings, certainty is the best we can achieve.
Secondly, in refutation of Frankfurt’s attack of the memory thesis, Descartes does seem very concerned with “providing grounds for trusting recollections of what has been clearly and distinctly perceived.” Descartes, in the Second Set of Replies writes:
...when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to those arguments by means of which we deduced them (CSM II 100).
Here, Descartes is asserting, very directly, that awareness of God is required for knowledge, which is the sum of recollected conclusions of past arguments. Frankfurt says only of this evidence (which he does not directly site), “The passages in which Descartes attempts to answer the charge of circularity do indicate that memory has something to do with the problem he tries to solve by proving God’s existence...”26 For clarity, I will provide the following outline of how I interpret Descartes’ understanding of past and present clear and distinct perceptions before continuing:
(a) present clear and distinct perceptions are certain.
(b) past clear and distinct perceptions are not certain.
(a) is true because we can not doubt present clear and distinct perceptions because they are psychologically certain. (b) is true because we can doubt the reliability of our memory, unless we are aware of the benevolence of the author of our being; God. What must be proved, then, to acquit Descartes of circular reasoning is that the existence of God can be proven simply, clearly, and briefly. Descartes asserts, in many places, that awareness of God is similar to a first principle, or that which is “self-evident” and a “simple intuition of the mind”. In Part One of the Principles, Section 14, Descartes writes:
The mind next considers the various ideas which it has within itself, and finds that there is one idea - the idea of a supremely intelligent, supremely powerful and supremely perfect being - which stands out from all others (CSM I 197).
Also, in the Second Set of Replies, Descartes makes a strong claim about the certainty of the existence of God:
Fifthly, I ask my readers to spend a great deal of time and effort on contemplating the nature of the supremely perfect being. Above all they should reflect on the fact that the ideas of all other natures contain possible existence, whereas the idea of God contains not only possible but wholly necessary existence.
This alone, without a formal argument, will make them realize that God exists; and this will eventually be just as self-evident to them as the fact that the number two is even or that three is odd, and so on. For there are certain truths which some people find self-evident, while others come to understand them only by means of a formal argument (CSM II 115).
If an awareness of God is like the realization that “the number two is even or that three is odd” then the existence of God is a first principle, and Descartes can validate past conclusions of clearly and distinctly perceived arguments, because he will not have used knowledge to validate knowledge (which is circular).
6. Conclusion: Once Descartes convinces himself that the idea of God is utterly evident, clear, and simple (like basic mathematical propositions), then he can be certain of his recollected conclusions from past arguments. However, we can question whether or not an awareness of God is, in fact, like the Cogito or other “self-evident” perceptions. It seems as though there would be little need for attempting to prove the existence of a benevolent God if it were completely simple and clear.
And, much of Descartes’ time and effort is spent in pursuit of arguments and proofs for the existence of God. However, Descartes does assert that “there are certain truths which some people find self-evident, while others come to understand them only by means of a formal argument” (CSM II 115).
In any case, my conclusion is this:
If one convinces oneself that a benevolent God exists, and one is convinced that this being’s existence can be proven using first principles, then one must also be convinced that one’s memory is sound, and therefore, one is convinced of the soundness of recollected conclusions derived from arguments using clear and distinct perception- which allows one to have stable knowledge about the world.
Proving God has problems. But, as I have asserted, one needs only to prove God to oneself in order to be certain of one’s nature. In the Dedicatory Letter to the Sorbonne, Descartes writes:
It is of course quite true that we must believe in the existence of God because it is a doctrine of Holy Scripture, and conversely, that we must believe Holy Scripture because it comes from God; for since faith is the gift of God, he who gives us grace to believe other things can also give us grace to believe that he exists. But this argument can not be put to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular (CSM II 3).
It seems as though circularity can only be absolutely escaped when one uses faith, and uses such belief to convince oneself of the existence of God, regardless of inherent difficulties. In doing so, one becomes psychologically certain about one’s nature. The atheist, lacking faith, is left to wonder about his his or her nature, and left, in Descartes’ system, without knowledge, remaining paralyzed on only current clear and distinct perceptions.
Footnotes:
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