| The Function of Physical, by Anthony Peter Iannini, 1997 |
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Essay Overview: A short essay that attempts to show why two materially distinct systems will always have some degree of functional difference. I no longer think this is necessarily true, but the point is interesting because it was my very first instinct to think so. In fact, I currently believe that two systems can be materially distinct (or unequal) and be completely functionally identical.
The physical world and its interaction with the concept of “mind” has been thought about since the earliest philosophers began to consider what a thought actually was. Descartes believed that a mind, and thought, was made of a non-physical substance that had no spatial position. Many problems arose.
Brain damage, disease, and other physical elements seemed to affect the non-physical mind. Explanation was difficult, if not impossible, because it is illogical that a non-physical thing could affect a physical thing.
This notion, that something exists beyond the realm of observation and science was eventually deemed useless due to its impotence in the realm of testability. Behaviorism, a study of the input and output of mind was the first step towards an understanding of the mind.
Eventually, the modern philosophies began to look at the underlying physical nature of the mind in ways that were not previously possible. Neuroscience and the advent of sufficiently capable computers have opened up the doors to new realms of understanding.
Most modern philosophies, which have incorporated advances in neuroscience to further understanding of thought, have looked at the mind in a physical sense. Materialists hold that there is nothing but a physical world, and everything in it is physical. The materialist point of view holds that science and the laws of physics govern mental activity.
This so-called “Hardware” theory of mind has been looked at more carefully with the advent of computers and the field of science called Artificial Intelligence.
Philosophies such as Functionalism, have emerged which do and do not consider the underlying mechanisms which reflect the input and output relationship of a given system. Hardware and software in any system, human or computer, can be shown to have a great many differences, while still harboring underlying similarities.
The interaction of software, which is defined as instructions or programs which run on the hardware, is an integral part to the system as a whole. These programs can be clearly seen in the computer system, but are less evident in the human brain and body for reasons of complexity.
It would not be argued that we were the creators of the computer, and therefore understand every basic working and function of such a system. However, evolution and millions of years dictated the hardware and “software” development in the human brain.
Neuroscience seeks to understand these processes, and currently, is still attempting to do so (Churchland, 103). Functionalist views hold that the input and output relationship of a given system is not dependent upon internal structure, or hardware. For example, this is true of a calculator and the world’s most complex computer system. The small pocket calculator, given “2 x 2” will quickly output “4”. The same is true of the large super-computer.
While these two mechanisms are different, their intrinsic nature depends on the same structure; electronic circuits and some form of an output display. The Functionalist would hold that given the same input, within the bounds of this pocket calculator, its output and the output of the super-computer will be the same, regardless of internal structure. This philosophy, which resembles a more complex and thorough behaviorism in general, also has flaws when other examples are provided.
Ned Block, in his essay, “Troubles with Functionalism”, points out many of the flaws that accompany the lack of focus on underlying mechanisms. One is the problem of infinite input and output relationships, similar to the behaviorists dilemma. Also, the problem of sensory input and mental states arises as a problem of Functionalism (Block 211) Materialists hold that the underlying mechanisms are crucial to the input and output of a certain system.
Given the pocket calculator example, the materialist would take it apart and realize that it is because of its design and construction that it gives the same output as the similar, yet much more powerful super-computer.
This example seems to be more in support of Functionalism than Materialism, yet it is not. Imagine that the small pocket calculator an infant member of some hypothetical species. The super-computer is more like an old member of this species, fully developed and capable of more complex input and output relations with respect to images, hard drive, and a more developed system of memory.
When asked the answer of “2 x 2” both the baby and the adult will be able to give the correct answer of “4”. However, when the baby calculator is asked to recall a graphical image, it is incapable of doing so.
This is similar to species found on Earth. A human infant has, from birth, the same basic mechanisms as a fully grown adult human, but has not reached full development of these mechanisms. It is hard to imagine a small calculator growing into a full grown super- computer, but this is for the purposes of example only.
The baby human, when pricked with a sharp thorn, will most likely grimace and move whatever limb that was pricked away from the source of pain. The adult human will react in the same way. However, when asked, “What did you eat for breakfast?” the baby will not respond by doing anything more than drooling.
The adult, if in a normal mental state, will answer something that is clear and intelligible. The baby, because of its hardware is capable of some basic reactions, as is the fully grown adult. Up until this point, it would seem as though both the Materialist and Functionalist views are compatible.
However, here is where the problem lies. The super-computer, no matter how complex and developed will never be able to exactly mimic the input and output relationship of the fully grown adult human.
It may not even be able to exactly mimic the inputs and outputs of the infant human. Why? The central difference is the hardware. This is shown more clearly with a concrete example. Suppose a group of computer designers and Artificial Intelligence experts were to assemble an design a sophisticated computer program named “Bob”.
Bob would exist only in the complex structure and routines of a computer program, together with the memory and hard drive of the computer itself. Next to Bob, we stand a fully grown human being for purposes of comparison. Bob would be able to mimic many of the conversational input and output relationships of a human, but Bob would lack many sensory inputs, such as sight, sound, smell, and touch. When asked, “Bob, what do you see?” the computer will not respond.
The human will explain what it is that he sees through visual perception. To compensate, Bob’s designers realize that it will take peripheral hardware for Bob to hear, see, smell, taste, and touch just like the human. After these things are added, Bob is asked, “What does this tennis ball feel like Bob?” He replies, soft, round, and fuzzy.
The human would reply with much the same information. Then, Bob is asked, “What does it feel like to walk on this floor?” Bob can look at the floor, judge what it will feel like, but without legs, he can do nothing more than predict. So, Bob’s designers fit Bob with a crude body, complete with legs, arms, and all the basic structures of a human.
John Searle, in “Minds, Brains and Programs” says “…a robot would, [with a television camera for eyes, arms and legs, and a computer “brain”] be able to have genuine understanding and other mental states” (Searle 514). The human, when asked, “What does it feel like to walk on this floor?” would walk and reply just that, what it feels like to walk on the floor. Now, standing, Bob is beginning to resemble the human more and more.
One of the scientists pinches Bob on the arm. Bob, because he does not have a nervous system, does nothing. The human is pinched, and reacts by grimacing and jerking away from the source of pain. Bob is given a series of nerves, an outer coating of flesh, and a skin surface like that of a human. So now, on the outside, Bob appears entirely human.
Even though a passer by may not be able to deduce that Bob is not a human, there are still situations in which Bob will not be able to act human, because of his internal characteristics. If Bob were stabbed with a knife, he would not bleed, because he has no blood stream or vein system.
If Bob were hit in the head, enough to cause brain damage in humans, he would react differently, possibly with some difference form of malfunction. And, if a toxic gas were placed in his air supply, it would not affect him, because he has no internal organs to be affected by. In all cases, he could argue his best to be just like a human, but without human insides, he could not exactly mimic the human.
So, Bob’s designers fit Bob with a blood stream, internal organs, a brain, sexual organs, and everything else a human has. The designers may say that now Bob can perfectly mimic a human being.
This would, of course, be true, but what is Bob now that all of his physical parts have been replaced by human organs? He is literally human. If all of his parts are now human, and nothing is left of his initial “computer” self, then what could he be but completely human?
So it is logical to assume that only a human, with human programming and human hardware can act completely human. The problem also lies at the heart of how computers work. The pocket calculator and the super-computer both have more in common than many would think. Circuits using a very basic structure, one path or the other, are used to do mathematical computations.
These basic circuits are increased in number and speed, in combination with storage forms such as RAM and ROM1 memory, and more permanent memory types such as hard drives and disks. Sound is produced through additional hardware, as is voice recognition. But, at the heart of the system, there is little more than the basic circuits.
This is a more Materialist way of viewing the computer, as separate pieces making up a whole. The eliminative aspect of the computer seems to point to the idea that the most advanced computer will never do anything more than the pocket calculator, just in a more efficient and complex manner.
Philosopher Keith Campbell states, “It [Central-State Materialism] insists that the only properties the nervous system has are the properties recognized in chemistry and physics, together with their derivatives.” (Campbell 192). Materialists deny any spiritual or non-physical substance and agree that humans are no more than sums of their physical parts.
However, the differences in the hardware and programming of humans make them intrinsically different than computers. Initially, evolution was the method by which are hardware structure and programming developed, and the environment in which we grow shapes both of these elements.
Also, our physical structure is biochemical in nature, allowing our brains and bodies to change in order to more effectively interact with our environment.
Neuroscience has found that the hardware of the human brain actually changes so that new information, memories, thoughts and such can actually be accessed in a more applicable manner. The problem with the computer, in relation to mimicking a human, is that it is incapable of physically changing its own structure in order to better interact with its own environment. Part of the human programming is internal change, through time, and through reproduction.
The latter aspect, reproduction, is the process by which we change through random changes in the programming which gives us our initial conditions to adapt to our environment. The computer has no such mechanisms at this time.
This limitation of the computer, however, in no way means that one day we may not make a new kind of computer that is biochemical in nature, and is better able to adapt to its environment. But, the idea that seems to make the most logical sense, is that no computer will ever be able to act like and perform the tasks of a human brain unless it is exactly the same in composition and programming.
The only computer that will ever be able to exactly be like the human brain and body, which is integral, will be a copy of the human brain and body. In John Searle’s essay, he states, “Assuming it is possible to produce artificially a machine with a nervous system, neurons and axons with dendrites, and all the rest of it, sufficiently like ours, again the answer to the question [could a machine think like us?] seems to be obviously, yes.” (Searle 517) In spite of all this, the Functionalist approach does have merit in that it seems to work in many situations. My argument has been based upon all situations.
Take, for example, a race of beings on some distant planet. Say that these beings see more of the light spectrum than we do, and the portions of visible light that they can see is inverted in comparison to our own. An average human may see red, whereas the alien creature sees green. If both the red and green object being observed is agreed upon as one color, regardless of how the internal recognition is achieved, then it would make no difference what the internal hardware actually is.
However, if the alien could see some form of infra- red, and the human could not, then the differences in hardware would cause differences in communication and in how perception of the physical world is understood. If these creatures feel hot as cold, but still understand that this sensation will cause harm, it does not matter, they will still avoid the source of heat that feels like a source of cold.
The underlying mechanism of heat, the average kinetic energy of the molecules is irrelevant, the only point that matters is that the heat means harm. In much the same way as the computer can never be totally human, the alien can never completely react like a human in all situations.
Therefore, Functionalist approaches to perception and hardware are applicable to closed situations and examples. However, when a whole creature or system is taken into consideration, certain flaws arise.
Again, it seems as though the only way for any system or thing to react in the same exact way as a human, is for that system or thing to be exactly human in composition. Using the same argument, nothing but a computer can ever act completely like a computer, given all input and output relationships.
Another difficult problem also arises when comparing two systems that are exactly alike in both programming and hardware. For example, take two completely identical human beings.
This is not a possible situation, as in the case of identical twins not be exactly alike except for physical features. But, theoretically, if two completely identical humans were created, and placed in a room, their very spatial positions could cause variation. Science states that all physical things affect other physical things through four fundamental forces. One of these forces is gravity, another is electromagnetic.
The latter two deal with the weak and strong nuclear forces present in subatomic particles. Say we put these two identical people in a room where there is nothing but a desk, a few chairs, and some paper and pencil.
Of course, gravitational effects from the chair and the desk would be small, but the Butterfly Effect2 would eventually (seemingly instantaneously) cause changes in patterns of thought in some form. Also, differences in the electromagnetic force would predictably cause differences in the thoughts of the two people.
This is true, unless the dualist theory of mind is true, and the mind is actually something non-physical. This non-physical philosophy proposed by Descartes has no logical or scientific basis, so this would not seem to be so. Therefore, the slight gravitational pull from different objects throughout the universe and the room would change the way these two people think.
It could not be determined how the person would have thought without the effects of the electromagnetic force or the gravity, because that would require going back in time.
The only possible way to determine what the person was thinking is if we could eliminatively determine thoughts by knowing all of neuroscience and its interactions. In conclusion, the very physical nature of things and systems seems to intrinsically make it impossible to exactly mimic the input and output relationships of other things and systems. In the case of the human, only the human can be like the human.
In the case of the computer, only the same computer can give the same exact input and output in given situations. And, even two humans, two identical humans, can give varying output due to the very physical nature of their composition and the various forces acting on their physical compositions.
Works Cited:
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Block, Ned. “Troubles with Functionalism.” The Nature of Mind. Ed David M. Rosenthal. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. 211-228
Campbell, Keith. “Central State Materialism.” The Nature of Mind. Ed David M. Rosenthal. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. 189-196
Churchland, Paul. Matter and Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
Searle, John. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” The Nature of Mind. Ed David M. Rosenthal. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. 509-519
