| Intrinsic vs. Derived intentionality, by Anthony Peter Iannini, 2000 |
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Essay Overview: This is an essay that attempts to clarify the debate between the nature of intrinsic and derived intentionality orcalifornia new years "aboutness". It is a debate about how systems come to represent other aspects of reality in terms of having a referential relationship to such parts.
Intentional states in systems are (broadly defined) those states which are about or represent something. There has been, for somebad credit report repair time, a debate concerning the ways in which an intentional state in some system can come to represent what it is intended to represent.
The general distinction that has arisen lies between what has been called intrinsic, natural, or original representational systems and derived or conventional representational systems.
The former type of representational systems, which I will refer to as natural representational systems, are those that can “…be designed to do a certain job and, thus, have the function of doing it without being designed by anyone to do it” (Dretske, 1995, p. 7).
Those who support this distinction argue that certain systems, such as bodily organs and sensory systems, do not get their intentionality from any human attribution of what the states of certain systems represent. The latter type of intentionality, which I will refer to as derived representational systems, are foundtienda the phone house valenciadmv california san diego when “…a thing’s informational functions are derived from the intentions and purposes of its designers, builders, and users…” (Dretske, 1995, p. 7).
In asking whether or not the conceptual distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality is accurate or useful, it is helpful to illustrate some examples of each.
The notion of intrinsic intentionality has been used to describe the representational character which is built into systems. For example, the Fodorian notion of mentalese or a language of thought has been advanced by philosophers such as John Searle as a good candidate for natural representation (Searle, 1980, p. 417-448).
Using this example then, the innate mental language would have a foundational type of intentionality that humans have no ability to ascribe representational content to.
On the other hand, derived representations are those representations that we attribute topuertos que usa cada servicio certain artifacts such as written words, drawings, and other such artificial constructions. The essence of a derived representation is that is relies on an interpreter with intrinsic representational systems to attribute representational content to some artifact.
However, one crucial question that has been raised in objectionangel chapter 13 bankruptcy law firm to this distinction is, given that there is a language of thought (or other intrinsic representational systems), where do the meanings of the symbols it uses to communicate originate from? Daniel Dennett raises this fundamental question and concludes that the notion of intrinsic intentionality can be replaced by derived intentionality without losing anything (Dennett, 1996, p. 50-55).
It is my intention to support this view against intrinsic versus derived distinction, and show that we need only posit derived intentionality. I think this can be shown by arguing that (1) the notion of intrinsic intentionality is internally problematic and (2) evolution can be seen as a blind designer which provides organisms with derived intentionality through a process of random mutation and natural selection.
The notion of intrinsic intentionality rests on the assumption that certain intentional systems are not designed and, therefore, receive their intentionality through some other means. But, by what means, other than some intended function by some causal force (be it sentient or a force of nature), could any system be attributed representational characteristics?
As Dennett states, “…the brain is an artifact, and it getsblack bad girls whatever intentionality its parts have from their role in the ongoing economy of the larger system of which it is part…” (1996, p. 52-53). In this way, we can see that what have been considered artifacts with intrinsic and derived intentionality can be seen in the same light.female doctor with anal thermometer
A word that I write on a piece of paper gets its representational character through the larger system of which it is a conceptual part. For example, if I write the word “love” on a piece of paper, it is representational only in those cases where we include a system that can interpret the word as having some meaning.
The words themselves mean nothing. But, though it is less obvious, the same can be true of intentional states of the mind. Some token state t of some system X represents something because X has been made such that the presense of t in X is representational of something.
For example, in normal humans, areas of the brain can be activated to release a number of chemicals when the concentration of water in the body drops below a certainwalgreens healthcare plus mail orderhealthy food store prime concentration.
The release of these chemicals are representational of a deficiency in the amount of water in the human body. The body must be designed such that the presence of these chemicals (that are representational of water deficiency) cause physiological effects such as water retention by the kidneys and psychological thirst in order to counteract the water deficiency in the overall system.
How would some system come to react in such and such a way given such and such representational states? Systems, such as computers, could be designed by humans to have certain states that are representational. However, this is not disputed by the supporters of intrinsic intentionality. What is in dispute, is whether or not we can look at evolutionary forces as designers that may not, themselves, have intentionality.
It is assumed by those who supportbizcocho helado the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality that only systems that already possess intentionality can attribute intentionality to non-intrinsic intentional systems.
In other words, only intentional systems can give rise to derived intentionality. This would be true if intrinsic intentionality existed. However, if we see evolutionourense museo da cornamusa as a blind watchmaker, we can see how derived intentionality can, in fact, come from a non-intentional causal force such as evolution (Dawkins, 1996).
When humans create a thermometer, for example, one made of a glass tube and mercury, we are designing an artifact that will give us some kind of useful information.
It is useful for humans to know the temperature. Analogously, evolution, through a process of random mutation and natural selection, designs artifacts that will endow the system in question with, for example, a system that communicates useful information about some other state. The eyes, for example, are one such system.
They react to certain patters of light and send neural impulses to parts of the brain that coordinate movement, emotion, and a number of other critical systems.
If a pair of eyes and optic nerves are severed from the human system they were once part of, there is no more representational information being transduced.
Therefore, the thermometer and the eyes are useful representational tools only when included in the larger system. The thermometer, without interpretation and understanding ofquito ecuador escort service carolina swinger the purpose of the mercury level, will mean nothing.
Likewise, the neural impulses have no intrinsic meaning. The optic nerve impulses only mean something when interpreted by the relevant areas of the brain, like, for example, the occipital cortex.
In an illustrative example, Dennettrefinance home loan tennessee has us imagine a robot that has written down a sequence of letters. Upon writing these letters in a certain sequence, we ask the robot what the meaning of the letters is (1996, p. 53-54).
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These letters, interpreted by a human, mean nothing. However, to the robot, the sequence of letters is a meaningful note that reminds the robot of a good rule to decide how much milk to buy and the best price of the milk.
The note, like a space in the robot’s memory, is a representational artifact that, when referenced, has representational content. The purpose of this situation is to show that in this case we must consult the author of the artifact to understand what the artifact represents. But, the author of an intentionally derived artifact hasbad credit education loanmodelos honda biz only derived intentionality. Dennett writes:
I introduce it [the robot] in order to show that within its world of merely derived intentionality we can draw the very distinction that inspired the contrast between original [intrinsitic] and derived intentionality in the first place…This is instructive, because it shows that derived intentionaluity can be derived intentionality. It also shows how an illusion of intrinsic intentionality (metaphysically original intentionality could arise) (Dennett, 1996, p. 54).
Given these examples and relevant arguments, it appears as though both intrinsic and derived intentionality can be captured within the conceptual net of derived intentionality alone. The motivation for maintaining the distinction can be shown to be misguided in that it makes a mistake about the nature of something being designed and the relation to which something must stand in order to be intentionally derived.
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It is my conclusion that the notion of intrinsic intentionality, as it stands, should be replaced with a new formulation of derived intentionality. In order to keep a more subtle distinction, perhaps we could attribute humans with a kind of arbitrary first-order derived intentionality and their artificialremote desktop security creations that possess intentionality as second-order derived intentionality (relative to humans). In this way, we could track from which source intentionality of some artifact was derived.
Works Cited:
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Dawkins, R. 1996. The Blind Watchmaker. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Dennett, D. 1996. Kinds of Minds. New York: BasicBooks.
Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Searle, J. 1980. Minds Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417-458.
