the philosophy
of meaning


graphic showing that meaning is a process of reference, whether in the world or in the mind or both



In one sense, meaning is the relationship between symbols and the mental representations they produce in an observer. In another sense, "meaning" is synonymous with "purpose".

Lexicographers work to preserve and impart what words in a given language mean in the former sense, while philosophers attempt to explain meaning in the latter sense.

From 2000: The universe is change; our life is what our thoughts make it. -Marcus Aurelius (121–180) Meditations. iv. 3.

The language and thought debate is centered upon two questions: (i) Does language influence the nature of thinking and/or the resultant states (thoughts) of thinking, and (ii) if language does influence the nature of thinking and/or resultant states (thoughts) of thinking, to what extent or degree does language influence the nature of thinking and and/or resultant states (thoughts) of thinking?

In what follows, I shall examine possible responses to the questions of (i) and (ii) in light of a critical analysis of the relevant work of Donald Davidson.

1. Perception of some state of the world X, by some state of the world Q, is the action of X upon Q.

This definition of perception in (1) is overly broad so as to make the ambitious attempt to incorporate all causal relations in the world under the umbrella of perception. The phrase "some state of the world" is intentionally vague so as to be able to represent anything that is a possible object or subject of perception. We could imagine that X is a sunset and Q is a human, or we could imagine that X is a quark and Q is the universe. Commonly, philosophers use the term 'perception' to be equivalent to "knowledge gained through the senses".

The phrase "I am perceiving a red ball" indicates that "I am gaining knowledge of the redness and ballness of the thing through one or more of my senses". But, this need not ensure that there is something externally causing my perception of redness and ballness.

We can perceive the redness and ballness of memories that we conjure up- memories which realists take to have originated with an externally existent object that was the source of redness and ballness. But, all my perception of redness and ballness need ensure is that there is something causing my perception of redness and ballness.

2. Some state of the world X is subjectively meaningful, to some state of the world Q at time t1, iff Q's perception of X at t1 causes conceptual branching in Q. The process of conceptual branching is an internal process which results in the perception of new subjectively meaningful states in Q at some future time t2, where the resultant state of Q at t2 is rewritten as Q2, and where Q Q2. Thefore, X subjectively means, to some state of the world (or system) Q, the the resultant perceptions of subjectively meaningful states by Q2.

What something means can be thought of, visually, as a branching tree where the interpreter is only aware of one branch but can navigate to others through shortcuts.

This understanding of meaning in (2) can be reduced to causal relations between any parts of the world in which the object of perception can act to change internal states of the subject of perception. The shouted word 'fire', if perceived by a human that understands English and has the proper sensory mechanisms, will cause some change in the internal states of the perceiving human. Therefore, to the human, the shouted word 'fire' is subjectively meaningful. Notice that it is irrelevant if the shouted word 'fire' is perceived in a dream (from an internal state of the human) or from another human (an external state of the human).

How far down the ontological pyramid we need to take this definition of meaning is questionable. But, if the action of some particle (the object of perception) upon some other particle (the subject of perception) results in a change in the internal state of the perceiving particle, we can say, under this definition, that a particle is capable of perceiving another particle and that the resultant state of the perception of a particle by the perceiving particle is subjectively meaningful to the perceiving particle.

We could imagine that changes in the kinetic or vibratory energy of the internal states of some particle could all be perceived properties of the particle that is the object of perception, and such changes are therefore subjectively meaningful.

This definition of meaning in (2) entails that perception of some state of the world X, by some perceiver Q, is a necessary condition for X to be subjectively meaningful to Q, but that perception of X by Q is not also sufficient for X to be subjectively meaningful to Q.

What would it be for Q to perceive X but for X to be meaningless to Q? Here, we must consider the fuzzy nature of the world and of the degrees to which X affects the states of the entire system Q in question.

(a) Q is a human being and X is an x-ray

(b) Q is a very small particle, and X is an x-ray

In both cases (a) and (b), there will be some internal change in Q. However, the relative significance of the changes are different enough in (a) and (b) to warrant the following problem: in a world where everything affects the internal states of Q to some degree, everything means something to Q to some degree.

In other words, there must be a fuzzy threshold that marks the territory between meaningful and meaningless given various conditions. There must be some degree of difference, I would say, between being hit by a microscopic virus in the air and an asteroid.

Both mean something to something at some level of conceptual analysis, but only the asteroid will mean something, to the human, at the moment. It could be argued that the virus means something to the human if and only if it manifests in illness but not if it does not. But, it could mean something to the internal biological antibodies.

 
"Brushfire", watercolor and ink by Anthony Peter Iannini

"Brushfire", Ink and Watercolor, colors inverted,
2006, by Anthony Peter Iannini

3. A proto-language, of some system Q, is the set of states of the world that, if perceived by Q, would be subjectively meaningful to Q.

A proto-language is any state(s) of the world that has meaning for the system that is perceiving such a state or states of the world. A meaningful state of the world for a cockroach, for example, could be the state of intense light which means the resultant internal states of the cockroach caused by the cockroach's perception of intense light.

In the cockroach's proto-language then, [intense light] means [run quickly]. If this were the only meaningful state of the world for the cockroach, then its proto-language would consist of one state. But, the cockroach's proto-language would probably contain a continuum of states of the world pertaining to various degrees of light intensity.

4. Thinking, as a process of some system Q, is the process of arranging and combining meaningful state(s) of the world in rule-like ways to produce more complex meaningful state(s) of the world called thoughts.

5. Rule-like ways include compositional and relational processess.

6. A natural language is a proto-language that includes symbols for rule-like ways.

How these definitions influence the language vs. thought debate: a proto-language is necessary for human-like thoughts. The question is whether or not a proto-language is also sufficient for human-like thoughts, which boils down to the question of whether or not the rule-like ways are innately specified or learned through experience. The question is, can rule-like ways of combining and relating of meaningful states of the world be learned?




Unless otherwise noted, all content on this site is by Anthony Peter Iannini, copyright 2011+ email: anthony@artbyai.com