| On Science and Religion, by Anthony Peter Iannini, 2001 |
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Essay Overview: This is a rather extensive examination of
science and religion, in light of critical realism- which tries to relate and make
compatible the two realms of human endeavor. This essay examines various attempts to combine scientific and religious ontologies.
In recent times, there has been an attempt to reconcile and relate the natures of both
science and religion in such a way that the two can be seen as compatible rather than
conflicting.
The nature of such a discussion between science and religion depends largely
upon (i) the context in which the an analysis of the two institutions takes place,
and (ii) the definitions of the words ‘science’ and ‘religion’.
The context of the discussion must be one in which science and religion are compatible and
the definitions of both ‘science’ and ‘religion’ must be made clear so
that there is no confusion between concepts.
The focus of this discussion will be to make
clear the context and definitions that allow for compatibility by examining (1) the
historical evolution of science and religion, (2) the philosophical ideas surrounding the
nature of each, and (3) an examination of the post-modern interpretations of both science
and religion.
Before examining the context in which science and religion can be seen as
using the same fundamental human cognitive resources for attaining knowledge about
reality, it is imperative that the question be asked— why, historically, have science
and religion been viewed as diametrically opposed to one another?
Scholar of the science and religion debate Alister E. McGrath writes, "Although
the controversy centering on Galileo is often portrayed as science versus religion...the
real issue concerned the correct interpretation of the Bible"(McGrath, 1999).
In this
often cited example of the conflict between science and religion, we can see, upon closer
inspection, that the problem arose more from institutional unwillingness to change than a
fundamental difference in science and religion. Yes, it can be said that the hierarchical
structure of the seventeenth century church was opposed to unorthodox views of the world.
It can also be said that the scientific community is often opposed to unorthodox changes
in scientific models of reality.
However, the church did change its views in light
of evidence and alternative methods of interpreting scripture. In this example, as in all
such apparent discontinuities, both religion and science are attempting to understand the
way the world works. The basic concept is that all people, for one reason or another, are
trying to interpret the world in the way that best makes sense to them.
What makes
sense to an individual depends upon their experiences (for example, religion and culture)
and their inherent characteristics (for example, intelligence and sociability), each of
which is different for all humans. With this in mind, the further analysis of the context and definitions that make science and religion compatible can begin.
The claims of science may, at first, seem to be fundamentally different than the claims
of religion. However, philosophical scrutiny has revealed possible relationships between
all forms of human knowledge— relationships that illuminate the similarities, rather
than the differences, between science and religion. This insight into how humans
communicate knowledge, and what the basis for claims about truth are, arose from an
examination of science’s rationality as a social institution. Inquiry into the nature
of science has revealed much about the nature of knowledge and truth.
The question at the
heart of this analysis and the philosophy of science has been a question about the purpose
of scientific claims. The notion that the purpose of science is to verify claims
seems to fail in light of the objection that, in order to verify any truth claim, one must
be able to observe all possible future conditions. The omniscience required for
verification led philosophers of science to look elsewhere for definitions of what science
does.
Karl Popper asserted that the purpose of science was, in fact, to falsify claims. Many theories, such as the theory of evolution, however, are rather impotent to
this analysis. And, the question of whether or not any theory can ever be truly falsified
has been raised in objection to Popper’s analysis. These and other analyses
eventually led to a new view of science; one that has greatly influenced our understanding
of how we think science is related to knowledge.
Philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, in his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, put forth the idea that science, contrary to what scientists believe,
does not forever grow in its understanding of the way in which the world works (Kuhn,
1970). Rather, science evolves irrationally, in the direction laid out by previous
paradigmatic changes in the way science sees the world and influenced by subjective
scientific communities.
To demonstrate this, he divides science into two distinct
categories. The first category that Kuhn discusses is what he calls "normal"
science. Normal science involves the rather ordinary day-to-day puzzle solving of
scientists. These efforts of scientists all take place within the framework of
understanding that has previously been laid down by what Kuhn calls
"revolutionary" science.
Revolutionary science, as opposed to normal science,
occurs when a new paradigm, or a new way of seeing the world envelopes the scientific
community. This new world view may encompass some of the old scientific understanding, but
leaves much of it behind.
Kuhn vividly illustrates the occurrence of revolutionary science and its abandoning of
old notions by pointing to the history of science. For example, in the Newtonian framework
of understanding, anomalies were found to exist that could not be explained within the
framework. In spite of these anomalies, normal science would continue by either ignoring
or giving up the search for an answer to such anomalies.
When the anomaly could finally be
accounted for by a new theory, such as in the case of the advance of the perihelion of
Mercury, an instance of revolutionary science would exist. In this case, the Einsteinian
revolution would have explained the slight deviations in Mercury’s orbit that could
not be explained in the Newtonian scheme.
Truth claims about science in Kuhn’s view,
then, are dependent upon the scientific community and the paradigm that it has accepted.
This removes the certainty and absoluteness of scientific truth claims, and allows us to
draw analogies between the claims of science and the claims of religion.
However, Kuhn’s insight is not without serious criticism. One objection is that
Kuhn is using looking at past scientific theories in a substantive rather than a relational manner. For example, Kuhn sees the word "mass" in Newtonian and Einsteinian
paradigms to be incompatible. However, if we use these as defining relationships rather
than defining things in themselves, the words, in both frameworks, have meaning and are
useful.
If this is true, then Kuhn’s notion that choices of paradigm change are
irrational and based solely on the scientific community can also be objected to. If one
paradigm can communicate with another, as in the case of the Newtonian and Einsteinian
understanding of mass, then the workability of the concepts allows for rationality.
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, Kuhn does not address the outright success and
utility of science. Science has provided us with computers, for example, machines
that rest upon the paradigms of the past. Without the communication between paradigms, how
could anything have come from scientific endeavors?
Perhaps the reality of scientific
progress lies somewhere between Kuhn’s analysis and the assertions of the
puzzle-solving scientists who see the fruits of their labor before them. The important
point is that Kuhn has opened up the gates of possibility for the truth claims of
science to be compared with the truth claims of other areas such as religion.
A view that emerged from aforementioned philosophical inquiries into the nature of
science, called critical realism, holds that the truth claims of both science and
religion have at least partial correspondence with reality. All human communication, in
the critical realist viewpoint, is incomplete because things must be described by their
internal and external relationship to other things rather than being described
"in themselves". The methods of this incomplete communication of knowledge are
models, metaphors, and analogies— all of which are workable or useful but are incapable of describing anything with complete correspondence to what it actually is.
The language and symbols used to communicated knowledge are, in keeping within the
critical realist position, always evolving through time. Also, the fact that all knowledge
is communicated within a social community reveals that all knowledge is subject to dynamic
interpretation based on the views, ideas, and goals of the community in which the
knowledge is being communicated. Other tenets of the critical realist view include the
idea that different properties emerge and different levels of complexity and that concepts
which are used to make things work correspond to real entities.
Within the critical realist construction of how human knowledge is incompletely
communicated, direct parallels can be drawn between the truth claims of both science and
religion. On one hand, science begins with sense-data experience. On the other
hand, religion uses human or historical experience for its foundations.
Science continues its forming models of understanding by examining the interaction of
theory and data, and finally carrying out experiments to test the theory and data
interaction.
Religion uses fact and interpretation interaction and finally reflection to
construct its models of understanding. Both of these methods end in the explanations that
best fit the results of each. Science uses a best fit model once it has finished its
experiments, and religion uses a best fit model once it has finished its reflection. But,
the best fit models are not static.
Rather, they are forever giving way to the constant
experimentation and reflection in both the scientific and religious communities. Change in
the scientific and religious communities is subject to the same resistance as in any human
institution, though there may be noticeable variations in each. Now that the critical
realist position has been introduced and explained to some extent, we can continue to
examine the roots of the controversy between science and religion in the context of the
post-modern paradigm.
The post-modern paradigm seeks to reconcile two historically divergent methods of human
understanding; namely faith and reason. In the context of the critical
realist viewpoint, both faith and reason stem from workable relationships derived from
experience. As such, faith and reason actually coalesce into one coherent form of
understanding, founded upon parallel systems that each derive from partially corresponding
knowledge of the actual world. As difficult as it may be, we must make an attempt to
remove long-standing notions of arriving at knowledge through faith and reason as
fundamentally different.
Before presenting a historical account of the roles of faith and
reason, it is important to make an attempt at defining how faith and reason can be
made compatible. Faith is generally defined as unquestioning belief that does not require
proof or evidence. Reason is generally defined as logically reaching a conclusion through
steps which are supported by evidence. To some degree, faith does require elements of
reason. All people must have some experiential proof or evidence for any of their
beliefs.
Similarly, all reason requires some elements of faith. As logician Kurt
Gödel proved, all formal systems are essentially incomplete because parts of the
foundations of all systems can not be proven from within the system itself. Therefore, we
can imagine faith and reason as poles in one spectrum of human understanding. As such,
there are cases in which the end of the spectrum near reason can provide understanding and
in which the end of the spectrum near faith is the appropriate method for forming beliefs
about the world. This said, we can examine the historical evolution of the faith versus
reason debate.
A central figure in the presentation of the post-modern paradigm, Hans Küng, examines
the progression of thought related to the existence of god and the meaning of religious
belief in his book Does God Exist? (Küng, 1928). Rooted in the philosophy of the
seventeenth century, the faith versus reason controversy became most apparent in the views
of René Descartes and Blaise Pascal. As a rationalist, Descartes held that reason was the
supreme manifestation of the human intellect.
By using reason, says Descartes, man can
uncover the mysteries of faith, thereby justifying and solidifying the tenets of Christian
belief through an analysis of one’s own thoughts. The notion of god, which supports
the validity of reason itself, can be reached, according to Descartes, by using
reason— a peculiar argument known as the Cartesian Circle.
On the other hand, Pascal
found that faith, not reason, was the basis for uncovering truth and acquiring knowledge
about the world. However, without disregarding the importance of reason, Pascal reached
the conclusion that one must choose between believing and doubt, and, that there is no
certainty in faith— hence Pascal’s famous wager which proceeds as follows: If
there is a god, and one does not believe in him, one will lose the opportunity to have
eternal happiness. On the other hand, if there is not a god, and one does not believe in
him, then there is relatively little to lose.
Therefore, one should, as a matter of
probability and cost - reward outcomes, one should believe in god on the chance that such
a god exists. The problems with this view include the objections that Pascal is assuming
that god will punish non-believers, that god is the god of Christianity, and that the
existence of god entails the existence of heaven and hell also. This is similar to a
famous article by the philosopher William James entitled "The Will to Believe"
which asserts a more sophisticated, yet parallel, view to Pascal’s. |
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Both Descartes and Pascal, though from opposite ends of the spectrum, made a dualistic
attempt to combine two fundamentally different ways of interpreting the world. Though
reason and faith may or may not actually be divergent, as in the post-modern
paradigm, the notions of reason and faith at the time of the controversy were divergent
notions.
For Descartes to build an epistemological system based solely on reason that
could also incorporate the god and soul of the Christian tradition was a struggle, one
that seems to have failed in the end. In the same sense, Pascal’s willingness to
believe and his opposing reliance on reason as a justification for belief failed to
solidify the notions of faith and reason. Both men had something of a split personality,
in the sense that neither seemed to reconcile two ways of coming to acquire knowledge
about the world.
The philosophical notion of god, which bore little resemblance to the anthropomorphic
god of Christianity, was challenged. And, in the aftermath of the faith versus reason
controversy, it seemed as though reason had triumphed— leaving behind persistent
existential worries concerning meaning. However, new notions of god were being formulated;
once again on the philosophical front. Baruch Spinoza attempted to demonstrate, using a
geometrical proof styled analysis, a pantheistic notion of god. Spinoza’s concepts of
the supreme being were radical, though they allowed for a new direction in thinking about
the way in which the corporeal world, as opposed to the afterlife, could have meaning.
This "everything" notion of god was adopted by Georg W. F. Hegel, and led to his
philosophical (and theological) view that all humans are a part of god’s coming to
consciousness. As a new view of how god is related to the world and to humans,
Hegel’s philosophical views about religion were able to revitalize religion in the
context of the current paradigm. However, consequences of Hegel’s views that were not
initially taken into account caused problems for the panentheistic interpretation.
Several problems with the Hegelian view of god and god’s relation to the world can
be posed. Firstly, the idea that humans are entities through which god is coming to
consciousness seems to be an imposed system. Secondly, Hegel destroys religious notions of
god, and replaces them (most specifically the Judeo-Christian god) with a philosophical
god— which takes on new properties such as "coming to consciousness" and
existing in and as the world rather than outside of the world.
Though these
challenges are serious, the most important objection to Hegelian formulations of god is
that, if god is everything throughout human history, then god is an essential part of every episode of human suffering that has ever occurred. Hegel, according to his
critics, did not realize the importance of human suffering and the role that it plays
within his panentheistic view.
Küng, in his critical analysis of Hegelian panentheism,
examines both what he terms the secularity and historicity of god in order
to explain how god is related to the world and how god is related to man. The secularity
of god removes notions of a god outside of the world, residing in a metaphysical heaven,
and points to god’s existence in the world, and the existence of the world in god. The historicity of god refers to the living, active god that is both a part of
and separate from the actions of man.
A problem with Küng’s interpretation of the historicity of god, however,
is that it does not reconcile the problem of god’s action in the world and god’s
allowance of suffering as part of god’s relation to man. Küng writes:
Precisely as the eternally perfect, he [god] is free to seize the
"possibility" of becoming historical. "Possibility" therefore does not
mean unfulfilledness, potentiality, but powerfulness, superabundance, omni-potence...For
man’s being and action, this means that God is the living God who in all his
indispsability and freedom knows and loves man, acts, moves and attracts in man’s
history (Kung, 1978).
How is it that god can both have freedom in the world, know and love man, act,
and still allow for the human suffering that has so encompassed the whole of human
history? It seems as though Küng faces the same problems that Hegel was criticized for;
specifically for the problems of an ‘imposed system’, a ‘philosophical
god’ rather than a religious god, and most importantly, an inability to reconcile the
problem of god’s existence in the world, namely god’s "omni-potence"
and god’s allowance of human suffering.
It seems as though theology faces a dilemma
at this point. Either god has no place in the actions of man, or god does. If god does
have a place in man’s actions, then god must also have the ability to relieve
man’s suffering. If god does not have a place in man’s actions, then we have
taken the first step towards an atheistic concept of the divine being— a concept that
wonders why, if god has no place in the world, is there a need for a god in the first
place?
Various intellectual figures during the ensuing period put forth the idea that, for one
reason or another, god does not, and need not, exist. Ludwig Feuerbach, a theologian
turned atheist, stated, "God was my first thought, reason my second, man my third and
last thought" (Feuerbach, 1978). Feuerbach believed that the idea of god was nothing
more than an anthropological projection of human notions of goodness, intelligence, wisdom
and power.
The fact that god is put in human terms however, proves neither the existence
or non-existence of god. Feuerbach overlooked the fact that all entities must be
described in human terms, and that this human projection of relationship has no bearing on
existence. For example, take the quark, a particle that can not be directly observed.
Scientists, in speaking of the quark, use terms like ‘spin’, ‘flavor’,
and other very human terms. This returns to the notion that we can not describe things in
themselves, but only in terms of their relationships with other things.
Also,
Marx and Freud basically adopted the Feuerbachian notion of human projection leading to
the idea of god. Marx, in his famous line about religion (and consequently, god) as the
opiate of the masses, illustrates his view that the notion of god is nothing more than a
hopeful distraction from the reality in which people find themselves. Many variations of
Atheism were put forth, each with justification and observational conclusions about why
the notion of god came about and how it functions in society.
One consequence of atheism was directly related to the philosophy of Friedrich
Nietzsche, which was centered on the concepts of nihilism, or the meaninglessness
of reality. Nietzsche believed, like Feuerbach, that god is the creation of man. However,
Nietzsche took atheism a step further than his contemporaries. As a creation of man, god
provides reason, purpose, and meaning in a reality that lacks such qualities. Without god,
asserted Nietzsche, there is no basis for good, evil, or any other objective notions of
morality. The atheist then, must will himself to power, or create a morality
based on what is life-giving for the individual in question.
This new morality can only
come from the superman, or one who rises above man, as man rose above the apes.
This overman creates meaning and imposes it upon a reality in which no meaning is
conveyed. Another integral part of Nietzsche’s philosophy encompassed the notion of eternal
return, or the notion that history continually repeats itself. Nihilism, then,
questions whether or not reality should be and makes no claim as to whether or not being
in better than non-being.
Küng presents an alternative to nihilism, but can not refute that it is possible.
Rather, says Küng, individuals must make a choice about the meaningfulness of reality.
Either reality should be, has meaning, purpose, truth, and coherence, or it does
not. There is, in Küng’s analysis, no room for a dualistic interpretation in which
an individual fluctuates between trusting and mistrusting that reality has meaning. Küng,
however, provides no reason or justification for making the choice between
the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of reality. We must, in the face of this lack of
complete evidence, trust that reason is reasonable, and believe that reality has
unity and meaning.
In order to reach the conclusion of a meaningful reality, we must transcend without
transcendence, or from the respective views of Bloch and Hawkeimer, we must hope for a
better future and long for perfect justice. Küng asserts, in much the same way that
Nietzsche does, that the atheist has failed to reach the ultimate conclusion of his
philosophical view. Rather than reaching nihilism, says Küng, the atheist must have a
ground, a support, and a goal for trusting in reality because there are instances of
non-meaning encountered in experience.
This ground, support, and goal, asserts Küng, is
none other than god; the notion of which is derived from empirical and relational
observations about the world and the nature of being. Remaining the philosophical,
abstract god, however, poses problems for Küng’s analysis. God must be defined by
religion, and with it, take on the properties of identity, such as those found in
Christianity. Without such properties, notes Küng, people’s representation of god
would not be able to maintain as the ground, support, and goal of reality.
Although the post-modern paradigm resolves many of the traditional conflicts between
science and religion, many problems still exist. The essence of the post-modern paradigm,
that all knowledge derives ultimately from human experience, allows for parallels to be
drawn but also allows for human beings to have divergent views.
The theologian Edward
Schillebeeckx, in his book Church, examines the nature of the Christian religion in
such a way that both the believer and non-believer can understand the history of
salvation, revelation, and human suffering (Schillebeeckx, 1989). In the context of
experience as the basis of all knowledge, Schillebeeckx recognizes that both the atheist
and theist can lead a moral, good life.
The question then, is if the atheist can lead a good life, what need is there for
belief in god? God becomes a tool for relieving existential angst— the worries that
accompany an existence as a finite, limited being that, by nature, can not know what
proceeds the end of consciousness. It seems, however, that some humans have been able to
cope with their fears and worries about the nature of their existence in ways other than
belief in god, while others have not.
This fits within the post-modern paradigm, as all
people believe and hold knowledge based upon their life experiences, which may include
good or bad perceptions of religion. In the view of Bertrand Russell, the twentieth
century British philosopher, organized religion in general has been a force for social
ills, such as war and a stifling of free thought. Historically, though institutionalized
religion may have been such an entity, the post-modern religion of theologians such as
Schillebeeckx is a beneficial, life-preserving view of religion that does not allow for
the traditionally detrimental aspects of religion as an institution.
Another point that arises in the discussion of religion and god’s relation to man
is the nature of god. Many philosophers since Descartes have theorized an abstract god
that takes many forms and positions in the universe; many of which are in opposition to
the god of Christianity. For example, Spinoza’s god plays no role in human life and
history other than beginning all existence. Spinoza’s god was portrayed as
everything, a pantheistic and deterministic notion of god that reduced, in the context of
the time period in which he wrote, to a mild form of atheism. Other philosophers, such as
Leibniz, Hegel, and other more modern philosophical representations of a supreme entity
have strayed far from the biblical god of Christianity.
The problem with all of these gods
is that they are the gods of philosophy rather than the gods of religion. Küng asserts
that a philosophical god can not be the ground, support, and goal of reality because this
notion of god has no force or power to convey to those who believe. This philosophical god
conflicts with faith and perpetuates the perceived schism between science and religion by
attempting to come to know god through pure reason. Such endeavors to rationally prove or
understand god, such as those endorsed by Catholicism and by medieval theologians such as
Augustine, Aquinas, and others, have ended in the atheism and nihilism that we see in the
writings of Feuerbach and Nietzsche.
The answers to why the concept of god and religious institutions themselves have posed
problems in Western civilization are complex. Schillebeeckx examines the self as
independent and dependent upon the culture in which the self resides. This pluralistic
fact of human existence lends itself to the choosing between and amongst highly divergent
world views that suit the needs and tastes of the individual. This leads to different
concepts of god, including orthodox, abstract, and views that remove god altogether.
Religious institutions themselves have caused a rather paradoxical situation that is an
intrinsic part of any institution. On one hand, the church has served to preserve the
recollection of events related to faith and belief, while on the other hand, the church
has sought to preserve itself. As a human institution, the church has, historically, been
both a beneficial and detrimental force in society.
While it relays the human experience
to many, giving relief to existence angst over the centuries, it has also been a retarding
force in human exploration and thought. Many in Western Civilization find it difficult to
overcome the nature of the church as an institution and find themselves breaking away from
the orthodox or dogmatic views. Schillebeeckx himself, as a theologian of the post-modern
paradigm, finds the current and past hierarchy of the church to be detrimental to its real
purpose and writes of needed internal democratic reforms.
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The fact that there are a number of different religions, much like the fact that there
are good atheists, poses little problem for the post-modern paradigm. As all people
experience differently throughout the course of their lives, all people come to have
variant religions. Influences such as family, culture, education, and other such aspects
of ones environment eventually lead to a person’s choice of religious belief or
non-belief. In the context of Schillebeeckx’s theological perspective, no one
religion (or lack thereof) can be said to be better or more correct than any other unless
one is detrimental, unjust, or harmful to humans.
There does, however, seem to be a subtle
problem with this view. If there is, in fact, an objective reality, then there must also
be a most correct religious or non-religious view. For example, there either is or is not
a god. The epistemological question of how to arrive at this knowledge is uncertain, but
it clearly seems that there is a more corresponding view in terms of reality.
This problem
of greater correspondence to reality in one view or theory over another resonates
throughout the critical realist and post-modern understanding of science and religion, and
how to choose between one theory or another remains an unresolved problem that is
intimately tied to the critical realist notion of utilizing best explanation.
The post-modern scientific paradigm, which is grounded in new understandings of quantum
physics and cosmology, has revealed possible resolutions to long standing theological
problems. By doing so, the new scientific understandings of reality have allowed for a
greater concordance between science and religion. |
Current quantum theory models, such as those put forth by physicist David Deutsch in
his book The Fabric of Reality, which are based on the "many worlds"
interpretation, allow for a multiverse in which a solution to the problem of a
determinism is posed (Deutsch, 1997). Previously, in the paradigm following the Newtonian
revolution in mechanics, the causal relationship of particles led to the view that all
events have a direct and definable result which can only proceed in one possible way. This
causality was extended to all aspects of life, including human action and thought—
resulting in a problem of determinism.
Now, theories have emerged that open up a reality
in which all possible non-contradictory worlds may exist. Many worlds theory replaces the
dual complementary theory of light, in which light has both particle and wave properties,
by viewing reality in a multiverse in which "shadow" particles cause deviations
in the paths of real particles.
This allows for light, in the fundamental form of photons,
to require only the properties of particles in order to display properties that otherwise
would have to be attributed to a wave. Within this paradigm, a solution to the problem of
suffering and evil also arises. If, as it seems in the multiverse, all possible worlds are
expressed, then, in the context of theology, god would have created all possible
worlds— each with varying degrees of suffering, happiness, evil, and good.
In the context of a modern understanding of cognitive processes and the computer, it is
now possible to theorize what would traditionally be referred to as an afterlife. If, as
it seems to many philosophers and computer scientists, we are the instantiation of formal
programs that are realized in the human brain, then our cognitive selves can be reproduced
to preserve our consciousness. If, at some point in the future, humans were to be
"resurrected" it would require knowledge of our finite state computer, or our
physical structure, which is the realization of such a system.
Within this framework, our
consciousnesses could theoretically be placed within any virtual world, even possibly one
that is similar to the biblical views of heaven or hell. However, there seems something
contrary to the very essence of human consciousness when we consider a consciousness
completely free of suffering or, towards the other extreme, completely free of happiness.
It seems as though both happiness and suffering are relative, and exist more in the changes from one state to another rather than in the states themselves. For this reason, the
concepts of heaven and hell themselves must be revised. However, this poses problems for
the underlying religious view that there is an ultimate justice which transcends the
finite and limited justice on Earth.
Another scientific assertion made by Deutsch concludes that biological evolution,
rather than being a random process that ensues without direction, is actually an
epistemologically preserving process. This, together with the notion of a universal Turing
machine, a system that is theoretically able to calculate everything that is possible to
calculate given sufficient memory resources, allows Deutsch to present the Omega Point,
a concept developed by another physicist, Frank Tipler.
If certain assumptions about the
universe are true, namely that (1) the universe is spatially closed, (2) there are no
event horizons, implying the future c-boundary is a point— the Omega Point, (3) life
must engulf and control the entire universe, (4) the information processed between now and
the final state is infinite, and (5) the amount of information in the universe diverges to
infinity as the final state is approached (Tipler, 1994). There are empirical results that
suggest (1), and mathematical models that support (2).
Assumption (3) makes the claim, which is parallel to Deutsch’s, that evolution
provides intelligence and this intelligence is able to spread across the universe. Given
the notion of the multiverse, which was discussed earlier, it does seem possible
that, in some of these universes, intelligent life may spread across the universe in which
the life exists.
However, it seems that evolution is not driving towards an intelligent,
or more intelligent form of life at any time. Rather, evolution, through the process of
natural selection, acts to provide for the best mechanisms of survival in the environment.
Intelligence, it appears, is much more of an anomaly. It is clear from evolutionary
history that comparatively ‘dumb’ creatures, such as the dinosaurs, have been
the most successful, being the dominant life form for an estimated forty million years.
Human inhabitance of Earth, as an evolutionary extension of the primates, has only existed
for a small fraction of the time that other life forms have. There is a possibility that
all intelligent life is subject to the same extinctions as less intelligent life and the
possibility exists that the species, because of intelligence, destroys itself.
Evolutionary psychology puts forth the highly plausible idea that intelligence as we know
it can arise only in complex social groups, such as those of our primate ancestors.
The reasons for this are varied, but, for example, one rather convincing basis for
consciousness comes from the theory that interpretation of conspecific (other members of
the group) mental states requires reflexive thinking. In other words, for creature X to
predict what creature Y will do given a certain situation, creature X must be able to
imagine what it would do in that situation, given its own knowledge about interacting in
the environment— hence reflexive or conscious thinking (Mithen, 1996).
Tipler’s assumptions in (4) and (5), that information processing and information
itself both reach infinity as the final state approach are dependent upon (3), that life
engulfs and controls the universe. Also, as physical forces reach points at which
conventional organization of matter can no longer exist, it is difficult to see how any
universal Turing machine system can be stabilized so as to exist until the Omega Point is
reached. Deutsch writes of this point:
Matter as we know it would not survive: all matter, and even the atoms
themselves, would be wrenched apart by the gravitational shearing forces generated by the
deformed spacetime. However, these shearing forces would also provide an unlimited source
of available energy, which could in principle be used to power a computer. How could a
computer exist under such conditions?
The only 'stuff' left to build computers with would
be elementary particles and gravity itself, presumably in some highly exotic quantum
states whose existence we, still lacking an adequate theory of quantum gravity, are
currently unable to confirm or deny (Deutsch, 1997).
Just how we could harness these elementary particles that exist in admittedly
‘exotic’ states is difficult, though not impossible, to imagine. If, however,
the Omega Point is reached, based on the assumptions that Tipler has put forth, it
seems as though everything would be known, and the notion of god as omniscient would be
reached through the actualization of such a singularity in the universe.
This is a result
of the convergence between all of the possible worlds or multiverses in the quantum model
within the many-worlds interpretation. History, then, would be the leading up to the Omega
Point. And, from the Omega Point, consciousness could be extracted by means of the
finite-state computer model of the human mind. In a sense, consciousness could be
‘resurrected’ from the past.
The post-modern interpretation of quantum physics, cosmology, and the implications of
the Omega Point theory are still in dispute among the best minds. Though the many-worlds
interpretation of quantum physics has provided for a more consistent model of the nature
of light as a particle, there is debate about how this is to be interpreted when
considering other philosophical or theological notions.
The cosmological and biological
assumptions of this post-modern interpretation, of which there are many others, are highly
dependent upon other aspects of the nature of evolution at every level of organization in
the universe. And, Deutsch, who supports the physical interpretation that is used in
Tipler’s Omega Point, does not agree with the theological implications or evidence
that Tipler uses.
The theological basis of the Omega Point’s religious conclusions are supported by
post-modern theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, who writes, "Tipler is justified in
claiming that his statements on the properties of the Omega point correspond to Biblical
assertions on God. The God of the Bible is not only related to the future by his promises,
but he is himself the saving future that constitutes the core of the promises: ‘I
shall be who I shall be’ in Exodus 3:14" (Pannenberg, 1997).
That Tipler uses
this tautological statement found in the Bible as a basis or support for his theological
argument seems rather awkward. It is a statement that is, in fact, parallel to the Omega
Point theory— but there are other points in scripture, that, taken even quite
liberally would not seem to agree with Tipler’s formulation.
The notion that the
Omega Point is the result of informational preservation implies that god will come and is not present at the time of Biblical writings. If some scripture is supportive of a
theory and some is found to be contradictory, interpretations of the Bible must be
stretched to the point of implausibility.
And, the plurality of religions, each with
varying interpretations of the existence of, coming of, and summation of reality, seem to
be problematic to a physical explanation, such as Omega Point, with clear definitions,
implications, and assumptions. It is possible that Tipler is appealing to a form of
schizophrenic rationality, one that uses physics and an obscure line from a single
religion’s book amongst a plurality of religions and opposing interpretations.
Another possible problem for the post-modern paradigm arises from the concept of best
explanation and its relationship to the theories posed by both science and religion.
It certainly seems, from a historical perspective, that religious doctrine and beliefs
change according to the findings of science. For example, the Vatican has had to
acknowledge that the Earth is, in fact, not the center of the solar system. Also, the Pope
has declared that evolution may, in fact, be a viable theory of man’s decent on
Earth— though god must play some role in deciding the course of such evolution.
The
use of best explanation between science and religion seems to be a relatively one-way
street. Where science finds new theories that better describe the world, religion must
adopt its views to accommodate such views. The reverse does not seem to be true. There are
no cases, so far as I am aware of, in which religious theory about the nature of the world
has been adopted by science as an accurate representation of the world. If this trend
continues, as it seems to be doing, then what will be left of the religions of the world?
Perhaps science will begin to relieve the existential angst of humans.
The Omega Point
theory and understanding of human consciousness as the instantiation of a complex computer
program allow science to confirm or render rationally possible such concepts as god and
the soul. However, these redefinitions of classically held religious beliefs in scientific
terms leave religion without much of a foundation. In other words, if science can verify
all religious explanations in terms of science, what need is there for the religion?
Perhaps religion will come to be a kind of social gathering in which people discuss
ethics, rather than a place of holy worship of what would come to be known as a future
singularity of infinite calculations (the Omega Point) rather than the traditional notions
of an anthropomorphic god.
If scientific explanations could possibly relieve people’s existential angst
(which I believe they can) then the post-modern paradigm has, in my opinion, triumphed.
All human belief would then be redirected towards best explanation, and there would be no
need for a conflicting views between science and religion. Rather, science and religion
will have merged into one endeavor of human progress and reflection. In fact, in seems a
though the post-modern interpretations of science and religion are moving towards such a
cohesive conclusion. But, we must always be cautious when moving in such a novel
direction.
There will be, for some time, those who will adhere to religious beliefs that
are inherently dualistic and schizophrenic, such as the scientist who believes that
psychology can understand the mind, but also thinks that there is an immaterial substance,
or the fundamentalist who views young-Earth creationism as the best explanation of human
existence. This careful optimism is summarized by philosopher Bertrand Russell in his book Religion and Science, which was written in 1935:
The warfare between science and Christian theology, in spite of an
occasional skirmish on the outposts, is nearly ended, and I think most Christians would
admit that their religion is better for it. Christianity has been purified of inessentials
inherited from a barbarous age, and nearly cured of the desire to prosecute. There
remains, among the more liberal Christians, and ethical doctrine which is valuable:
acceptance of Christ’s teaching that we should love our neighbors, and a belief that
in each individual there is something deserving of respect, even if it is no longer to be
called a soul.
There is also, in the Churches, a growing belief that Christians should
oppose war. But while the older religion has thus become purified and in many ways
beneficial, new religions have arisen, with all the persecuting zeal of vigorous youth,
and with as great a readiness to oppose science as characterized in the Inquisition in the
time of Galileo (Russell, 1935).
There is more and more of a convergence between the post-modern view of science and the
post-modern view of religion. Though mainstream science and religion may still be at odds,
the most advanced and intelligent analyses of both areas of human endeavor are becoming
more and more compatible. In many cases, science seems to be justifying the possibility of
long held religious views about god, the soul, and suffering.
However, science is
approaching a point at which it may be able to provide solace for existential angst. In
this way, science and religion may merge into a single endeavor, as will all areas of
human understanding as we are able to better explain the world in which we live.
Old
standing scientific and religious viewpoints that remain at odds will most likely fall,
giving way to compatible views that make the most sense and provide the most comprehensive
explanation of the world that humans have ever been witness to. As a coherent, unified
system of epistemology emerges, we will see a new era that will likely transcend any
notions of scientific and religious conflict. Such topics, hopefully, will be left only
for the historians.
Works Cited:
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Deutsch, David. The Fabric of Reality. Penguin Books Ltd, New York, NY. 1997. p. 349.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. "Fragmente zur Charakteristik meines philosophischen curriculum vitae," in Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Schuffenhaur, Berlin, 1971, Vol. X, p.178.
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Second Edition) University ofChicago Press, 1970.
Küng, Hans. Does God Exist? An Answer for Today. The Crossroad Publishing Company, New York, NY. Originally published in 1928, reprinted in 1997.
McGrath, Alister E. Science and Religion: An Introduction. Blackwell publishers, Malden Massachusetts, 1999. p. 12.
Mithen, Steven. The Prehistory of the Mind, the Cognitive Origins of Art, Religion and Science. Thames and Hudson Ltd, London UK. 1996.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. (Adapted from lecture given at Innsbruck Conference on Frank Tipler's book The Physics of Immortality, June 1997, translated from the German by Wolfhart Pannenberg)
Russell, Bertrand. Religion and Science. Oxford UP, 1935. pp. 246-247.
Schillebeeckx, Edward. Church, The Human Story of God. (Trans. by John Bowden) The Crossroad Publishing Company, New York, NY. 1994.
Tipler, Frank. Tipler’s summary of the Omega Point theories assumptions: internet, http://www.math.tulane.edu:80/~tipler/tipler/tipler2.html.
Opinions of this essay and the topic as of 06/04/2010:
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Science and religion can be made compatible in the same way atheism and theism can be made compatible given certain definitions of these terms.
