some thoughts on st. augustine
 

All references in "(...)" are to Bosley and Tweedale, Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, Broadview Press; 1st edition, 1997

In the selections from his work Against the Academics, St. Augustine challenges the skepticism of the Academics through the use of a dialogue between his friends Licentius, Trygetius, and Alypius (443- 453A). The dialogue begins with a characterization of the Academics' views and an examination of truth.

Following this, there is a discussion of what it is to be a wise man and what it means to posses knowledge in the context of truth and wisdom. Finally, the discussion concludes with an analysis of what it is to assent to a proposition and the summation of Augustine's objection to Academic skepticism. I will attempt to show that both Augustine's criticism and the Academic's arguments are flawed, though Academic skepticism remains intact despite Augustine's criticism.

The Academics, as Augustine characterizes them, "...call that the 'probable' or 'what-is-like-truth' which can induce us to act while we withhold our assent" (443B). Licentius, early in the argument, remarks that it seems ridiculous "...that a person who does not what truth is, should say that he follows 'what-is-truth-like'." (444A). How could it be the case that one who does not know truth can know what is similar or 'like' the truth?

Analogously, if one does not have some concept of red, how is it that one can judge something to be reddish? Although it is a subtle move, the Academics can, however, escape this objection by retreating to the belief that their views are 'truth-like' rather than claiming they know what is 'truth-like', which is consistent with skepticism. This point will resurface later in the dialogue.

Augustine, at this point, questions whether or not the skeptics were privy to some special secret or their views were asserted truly (445A). Thereafter, Alypius cautiously presents his own views as representative of the Academics. He writes, "I think that truth has not yet been discovered...I think that it cannot be found" (445A). To support this, Alypius refers to "the authority of great and outstanding philosophers" who have come to such a conclusion concerning truth.

This appeal to authority is not explicitly directed towards any individual philosopher, but is highly suggestive of Socrates for reasons that will become apparent. Augustine states at the end of this section, "The point, therefore, at issue between us is whether or no[t] their [the Academics] arguments make it probable that nothing can be perceived and that one should not assent to anything" (445A). The whole group agrees on this point and the debate turns to a discussion of truth.

Augustine remarks that most philosophers hold that the wise man has found truth, yet the Academics hold that the wise man follows what is 'like-the-truth' (445B). As such, this view of the skeptics is consistent with the notion of truth not being attainable. In a following section where the discussion again begins, Augustine remarks that the only distinction between the philosopher and the wise man is that "the former loves, the latter possesses, wisdom" (447A).

Augustine then asserts an epistemological chain of reasoning that involves wisdom and knowledge and leads to his conclusion that the wise man must possess truth (447B). However, this is quickly objected to by Alypius, "I do not see why you should think that it is not the 'possession' of discovered probabilities that he has" (447B). Alypius goes on to ask, "Could he [the wise man] not believe that he has grasped wisdom?" (447B italics added).

The fundamental dispute between the Academic and Augustine at this point lies in an epistemological question: how do we know that the wise man knows the truth rather than merely believing that he knows the truth? Augustine appears to miss the point in his assertion, "But he who believes that the wise man knows wisdom, certainly cannot believe that the wise man knows nothing. Such a proposition is impossible, unless a man dares to say that wisdom is nothing. From this it follows that in this your view is identical with mine" (448A).

But, Alypius sees a divergence between "believing one knows" and "knowing" (448A). For the former to be true, there need not be any actual knowledge (which is, in this context, a true, justified, belief) involved. For example, someone can believe that they know that a unicorn just ate their hat. However, they can not really know this (assuming unicorns don't exist), because knowledge must correspond to something actual.

Augustine asks, in continuing the discussion about the wise man, "is it, or is it not, your opinion that the wise man knows wisdom?" (449B). Alypius responds that, if it is possible to find such a figure, then he must know wisdom. Following this, Alypius makes the remark, "But if you say that he [the wise man] cannot be found, then the question will be, not if the wise man knows anything, but rather if any one can be a wise man" (449B).

The Academics, according to Alypius, claim that the wise man can both be found to exist, and knowledge is not attainable. The conclusion of this is that the wise man knows nothing (449B). This notion is largely reminiscent of Socrates, who claimed that he knew nothing, and was declared the wisest man by the Oracle at Delphi in The Apology.

Alypius, in the next section, asserts that the Academics "can still withhold assent...and that assent must be withheld from everything" (450A). If the Academics are to withhold assent from everything, how can they make claims, even negative claims, about knowledge? Is this not doing the very thing they say can not be done? Perhaps not. The knowledge that one can not have knowledge may very well be of a special kind, one that can possibly be had even by a skeptic.

For one to assert that one knows that one can not know is a sort of cancellation of epistemological grounds for making any claims. This seems to be the route that Socrates took, and the route that the Academic skeptics are attempting to take. Augustine concludes the section dealing with the question of assent by stating "I am satisfied since they [the Academics] consider it no longer probable that the wise man knows nothing" (450B).

The Academics seemed to have been saying something like this, but subtly and importantly different— that the wise man knows that he knows nothing, which is the possession of a very special kind of knowledge. Augustine goes on to say, "Otherwise, they [the Academics] would be forced to maintain a most absurd proposition, that either wisdom is nothing, or the wise man does not know wisdom" (450B).

The latter option, that the wise man does not know wisdom is parallel to the view of the Academics that the wise man knows nothing, in the sense that he knows that he does not know wisdom— precisely because wisdom is unattainable. This is because wisdom in this context is a realization of the truth beyond the truth that truth is not available (as the skeptics would assert).

It may be said that the claim that one knows that one knows nothing is logically contradictory for the Academics to assert, but it need not be so. Although the notion is quite paradoxical, it is the main assertion about wisdom posited by Socrates in various Platonic dialogues, especially in The Apology. But, how is such a contradiction possible? How can the Academics entertain knowledge if knowledge can not be had?

It is because they are entertaining the annihilation of knowledge. Truth, as a necessary component of knowledge is absolute. Because we can never test claims against any absolute, there can be no knowledge because in order to be justified, there must be something to hold up to claims and determine their truth. No such test exists (nor can it exist), and, as such, there can be no knowledge for the Academics.

Therefore, they can know that they know nothing, because it is the negation of knowledge spelled out in such a way that it is syntactically contradictory, but semantically coherent. Because of this, it is plausible that the skeptical view can hold up to Augustine's objections. The kind of absolute agnosticism about propositions that the Academics believe should be adopted reflects the finite mind's incapacity to latch on to anything with absolute certainty— which is the product of truth (or that which we can never attain).

Augustine on Internal Knowledge (BT 453-454):
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In this rather short and clear section, Augustine begins his discussion by asserting that we do not understand our existence through use of the senses (BT 453B). Augustine asserts that, even if he is mistaken about his existence he must still exist because someone who does not exist can surely not be mistaken (or be anything else for that matter).

Can we know there is something above Human Reason? (BT 454-463):

This section is set up as a dialogue between Augustine and his friend Evodius. The dialogue sets out to ask (1) how it is evident that god exists, (2) whether or not all good things are from god, and (3) whether or not free will is one of the good things given from god (But, we only get part (1).)

Evodius classes (A) existence, (B) living, and (C) knowledge as three separate properties of things, eachbeing a more excellent property as we move from (A) to (C). Some things are merely existent (such as rocks), while others are both existent and living (such as animals), while still others are existent, living, and knowledgable (such as humans) (BT 454B).

Augustine and Evodius argue for a while about what god is. God, they conclude is "...than whom there isnothing superior." (BT 455A). And, the existence of this superior being will be clear when Augustine has "...demonstrated... as I promised, that there is something above reason (BT 455A).

They then begin to discuss bodily (exterior) senses and interior senses. They agree that the bodily senses (sight, touch, etc.) are of the same class and will present the same objects (the moon, stars, etc.) to various people. (BT 455A-B). However, Evodius asserts that "Apparently, each of us has his own private rational mind." (BT 455B).

This is followed by a lengthy discussion of the different between certain senses that can not be had by two people simultaneously. For example, two people can not smell the same exact particle of air because the particles that are 'smelled' by one person are not, precisely speaking, available to another person. They distinguish this between sight and hearing (though, if they had a more complex understanding of wave mechanisms involved in sound and color, they would probably not make such a distinction). (BT 456)

Augustine and Evodius come to the conclusion that our understanding of number(s) can not come from the senses and is necessarily true. Evodius writes, "But seven and three make ten not only now but always." (BT457A). And, Augustine notes that the number one is the basis for all numerical understanding.

He writes, "...every number is calculated according to the number of times it contains the number one" (BT 457A). The unity of the concept of 'one' can not, argues Augustine, come from corporeal objects because "...non of them [corporeal objects], as we have proved, is a true unity." (BT 457B). We must then know numbers "...by the inner light, of which bodily sense knows nothing." (BT 458A).

Because "number and wisdom" are somehow wrapped up in the same concept, Augustine goes on, at this point, to examine the concept of wisdom. Evodius notes that many different types of men have different understandings and opinions of what it is to possess wisdom (BT 458A).

Augustine, however, makes claims about what it actually is to be wise: "The more a person errs in his way of life, the less is he wise, the further he is from the truth in which the chief good is beheld and possessed...no one is happy without wisdom." (BT 458B). Here, and in a few places after, Augustine defines wisdom, and therefore, must consider himself wise. However, this seems to be, at best, circular reasoning.

The concepts of number and wisdom are compared and then contrasted, leading to Augustine's conclusions concerning 'something above human reason' (the title of the section) (BT461). I think the main points with which Augustine concludes the section are meant to show that by examining the concept of number (as a unity) and the concept of wisdom, we can understand that something must exist to have given us such concepts (BT 462).

As unity is unchanging and immutable (the number one), this is synonymous with what Augustine calls truth. Seeing truth, then, is the light of god that has been giving to humans (BT 462). He writes, "And what is more happy than to enjoy unshakable, unchangeable truth which is excellent above all things?" (BT 462B). Also, Augustine writes, "If there is anything more excellent than wisdom, doubtless it, rather, is God. But if there is nothing more excellent, then truth itself is God." (BT 463B).

All references in "(...)" are to Bosley and Tweedale, Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, Broadview Press; 1st edition, 1997

 

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